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Nietzsche's Legacy in Contemporary Political Thought

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Nietzsche's philosophy has come to play a pivotal role in contemporary intellectual debates in political theory. In my talk today, I have limited my remarks to issues involving the works of Foucault and Deleuze, two of the most critical interpreters of the Nietzsche renaissance in France in the 1960s and the 1970s.

The Nietzsche renaissance of the 1960s and 1970s took place in a climate characterized by the emergence of crucial philosophical and political issues: from the debate around the human sciences to the question of structuralism, from the development of the *nouveau roman* to the diffusion of the cinematographic *nouvelle vague*, from the first signs of the emergence of a new working class to the rise of social and political movements, from the crisis of old ideologies and fundamentalism to new political and existential experimentations.

In his talk 'Pensée nomade' ('Nomadic thought'), delivered at the international conference on Nietzsche held in Cerisy-la Salle in 1972, Deleuze asserted that the Nietzschean experience is a radical one inasmuch as it allows us to get rid of all forms of bureaucratization, which were dominant even in some political and theoretical orientations such as Marxism and psychoanalysis. On Deleuze's account, Marxism and Freudianism had become bureaucratic machines. Nietzsche's philosophy acted as a powerful machine of de-codification and de-bureaucratization.¹

Foucault's attitude towards political activism can be interpreted in the same way. We should not forget that Foucault started his intellectual exploration in the 1960s with important theories about madness that echoed the Nietzschean dimension of the tragic. Soon after, he engaged with challenges that were far removed from classical forms of political activism, such as his engagement with psychiatric or anti-psychiatric practices or his support in favor of revolts led by prisoners (with the Group of Information on the prison, GIP). His engagement in local struggles went hand in hand with his Nietzschean attentiveness to the emergence of a new economy of power.

In their views of Nietzsche's philosophy, both Deleuze and Foucault emphasized the importance of Nietzsche's genealogy as an instrument of analysis of the relations of forces. Their use of Nietzsche's philosophy may be interpreted as a contribution to expanding Marx's theories of exploitation towards a new domain that can better explain how we have been trapped in our own history and what the possible flight lines are.

They thus established a basis for a new productive confrontation with Marx's work. However, this implied the removal of Marx's work from the Hegelian hegemony and from its connection with Hegelian dialectic.

Nietzsche's philosophy had been accepted in France through a close *Auseinandersetzung* with Hegel. After World War II French philosophical debate was characterized by the resurgence of political activism associated with the existentialist-phenomenological trajectory of the interpretation of Hegel's philosophy.² The question of negativity was emphasized by Jean Wahl in his existentialistic reading of Hegel, through specific references to those sections of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* respectively consecrated to the self-consciousness (for the Lordship and Bondage) and to religion (for the question of the death of God).³ In a similar vein were Alexandre Kojève's lectures delivered at the École des Hautes Etudes in Paris between 1933 and 1939. Kojève put a specific emphasis on the question of negativity, by also exploring the dimension of finitude, which was at the core of Heidegger's philosophy. He established important connections between topics such as anxiety, nothingness, human beings, time, and being in his interpretation of the master-slave dialectic.⁴ Kojève's reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* importantly contributed to the transformation of French academic culture, which was concerned with abandoning its Kantian and spiritualist character. The Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian echoes of his reading of Hegel were to play an important role in thinking of his turbulent disciple Georges Bataille, whose reading of Nietzsche might be considered both a turning point and the attempt to link Hegelian negativity with Nietzschean sovereignty.⁵

According to the outline sketched here, we should not forget the importance of the work of the French translator of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Jean Hyppolite, one of the leading figures of Hegelianism in post-war France and master of Foucault and Deleuze, among others. In a tribute to him Foucault affirmed: "I think I am greatly indebted to Jean Hyppolite. I know that, in many people's eyes, his work is under the reign of Hegel, and that our age, whether through logic or epistemology, whether through Marx or through Nietzsche, is attempting to flee Hegel [...] But truly to escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him."⁶

Foucault's remark makes even more sense if associated with other overviews he gave of the years of his philosophical apprenticeship. In an interview given in the 1980s that casts a retrospective glance at the '40s and the '50s, Foucault says: "The interest in Nietzsche and Bataille was not a way of distancing ourselves from Marxism or communism – it was the only path toward what we expected from communism. [...] We were looking for other ways to that utterly different reality we thought was embodied by communism. That's why in 1950, without knowing Marx very well, rejecting Hegelianism and feeling uncomfortable in existentialism, I was able to join the French Communist Party. Being a 'Nietzschean communist' was really untenable and even absurd. I was well aware of that."⁷ These remarks help us to understand the complexity and richness of the new climate of intellectual inquiry that took root in France in the first decades after World War II.

Most approaches to Nietzsche's philosophy at this time emphasized the anti-academic function of his work: Nietzsche's experience of thought allowed one to deviate from the prevailing academic culture and to cast off one's personality. As Foucault

remarks: "What struck me and fascinated me about those authors [Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, Klossowski] and what gave them their capital importance for me, was that their problem was not the construction of a system but the construction of a personal experience. At the university, by contrast, I had been trained, educated, driven to master those great philosophical machines called Hegelianism, phenomenology."⁸

Foucault's encounter with Nietzsche was made possible through his reading of Bataille and Blanchot, who led him to radicalize his philosophical trajectory, which had until then dwelt largely on French epistemology (Cavaillès, Canguilhem, Bachelard). Bataille and Blanchot, as well as Nietzsche, are among the authors who influenced Foucault the most, especially their idea of a limit-experience that wrenches the subject from itself, since this implied a process of desubjectification. These authors offered him a way out of the dominant academic phenomenological culture.

Nietzsche's philosophy played an important role also in Deleuze's critique of the philosophy of the subject. But, in his case, it interacted with a different tradition: Deleuze encountered Nietzsche's philosophy through his reflection on Hume, Bergson, the materialist tradition of Lucretius, and the critical philosophy of Kant. Humean empirism allowed him to analyze human subjectivity from a dimension of facticity. Lucretius represented a radical alternative to the Platonic dialectics of rivalry. Bergson contributed by thinking of time in terms of duration and discontinuity. All these elements allowed Deleuze to develop an ontology of multiplicity which became the core of his philosophy.

These approaches helped to bring an end to the dehistoricization and depoliticization Nietzsche's work had undergone for some time. In fact, the historical identification of Nietzsche's philosophy of 'beyond good and evil' with the ideology of European Fascism had led a host of post-war commentators to engage in dehistoricization, depoliticizing Nietzsche's philosophy of power in order to rehabilitate his writings from the abuse they had suffered in the hands of his sister Elisabeth and the Nazi ideologists whose work she encouraged and inspired. As Keith-Ansell Pearson remarks: "the question of Nietzsche's status as a political theorist poses an enigma in need of some enlightenment. The great significance of Michel Foucault's reading of Nietzsche is that it is the first to take Nietzsche's work seriously for the concerns of political theory. [...] [His reading] sheds a great deal of light on two crucial notions in Nietzsche's corpus: the notion of power and the notion of the subject. [...] Foucault is able to show in what way Nietzsche's use of these notions is crucial for political theory."⁹

Let's now consider Nietzsche's statement "God is dead". Deleuze asserts that the proposition about the death of God includes a multiplicity of meanings. The death of God is important for Nietzsche, although this event needs to be given a meaning. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* rests on a double announcement: the death of God is intimately intertwined with the doctrine of the overman. The death of God takes on its full meaning only if it is associated with the doctrine of the overman. Nietzsche writes: "*I teach you the overman*. Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? [...] The overman shall be the meaning of the earth! I beseech you, my brothers: *remain faithful to the Earth* and don't believe those who speak to you of extraterrestrial hopes! They are mixers of poisons whether they know it or not [...] Once the sacrilege against God was the greatest sacrilege, but God died, and then all these

desecrators died. Now to desecrate the earth is the most terrible thing, and to esteem the bowels of the unfathomable higher than the meaning of the earth!"¹⁰

The proposition God is dead is highly dramatic in Nietzsche's philosophy. In *The Gay Science* it emerges through a dramatic sequence, including the madman, the heavyweight, and the *Incipit tragoedia*. The madman calls out: "Where is God gone? I mean to tell you! *We have killed him*, you and I! We are all his murderers! But how have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea?"¹¹ The sentence pronounced by the insane man is a temporal one. It is radically different from the proposition "God does not exist." It tells us that God existed *and* is dead. On Deleuze's account, Nietzsche's sentence is a pluralist and dramatic proposition: "The dramatic proposition is synthetic, therefore essentially pluralist, typological and differential. Who dies and who puts God to death?"¹²

If we accept the death of God as an isolated doctrine without any reference to the overman, we are still dwelling on nihilism and are unable to find out a way out from it. The death of God, Deleuze points out, is a grand, noisy, dialectical event; but an event which happens in the din of reactive forces and the fumes of nihilism. The dialectic foretells the reconciliation of Man and God, the replacement of God by Man.

Nietzsche explains that nihilism involves a long chain: it is about morality taking the place of religion, history and progress taking the place of divine values. In the *Antichrist* he attacks all forms of nihilism, from the negative to the reactive and passive, so including Hebraism, Christianity, Buddhism, the Reformation, free thinking, and democratic and socialist ideology. He says: "I consider life itself to be an instinct for growth, for endurance, for the accumulation of force, for *power*: when there is no will to power, there is decline. My claim is that *none* of humanity's highest values have had this will, – that *nihilistic* values, values of decline, have taken control under the aegis of the holiest names."¹³ Nihilism is about values such as evolution, progress, good, socialism, and happiness, replacing God.

However, such a replacement does not imply any important change. It only is a step forward in the desert of nihilism. Zarathustra draws on different figures of nihilism – from negative to reactive and active, from God to the murder of God, from the murder of God to the last man. The reactive man will take the place left behind by God. Man kills God to take the place left behind by an absent God. Values change, although the nihilistic perspective still remains.

In Book IV of Zarathustra, Nietzsche refers to a series of figures —the magician, the two kings, the ugliest human being, the leech, the last pope, the voluntary beggar, and so on, each of them playing a very specific role: bad consciousness, passive and reactive nihilism, science and religion as a product of culture, and so on. The reason why Nietzsche presents all these figures is embodied in the following: Zarathustra wonders if man is essentially a reactive force. All Zarathustra's visitors in some ways fail; they are failed figures, in Zarathustra's eyes. What Zarathustra means by failure is not the fact that man does not realize his own essence or accomplish his aim. Failure does not consist in man's incapacity to become an overman; the overman is not able to triumph where man has failed.

Human beings do not wait for the overman so that they can accomplish the unaccomplished essence of Man. The human essence is already accomplished, since it

coincides with the reactive becoming of man, namely, with nihilism. Overman may triumph only if he affirms and creates new values; overman is the result of a new composition of forces. The transvaluation of all values is the accomplishment of nihilism.

In the history of dialectic, Deleuze points out, Stirner has a place apart, because he was able to reverse the conceptual question 'What is Man' into the essential one 'Who is Man.' With 'what' the concept was sought for in order to realize it; with 'who' it is no longer any question at all, but the answer is personally on hand at once in the asker. Stirner addressed his critique against Bauer, Hegel and Feuerbach simultaneously. Deleuze refers to Stirner in order to explain the illusion of the dialectical movement, consisting in replacing God by Man. Feuerbach foretold Man in God's place. Man and God have been exchanged; but the labor of the negative is here to tell us: 'it is still not You.' Man represents only another Supreme Being, nothing in fact has taken place but a metamorphosis in the Supreme Being. Stirner penetrates yet again to the truth of the dialectic in the very title of his great book, *The Ego and His Own*.¹⁴

Deleuze's remarks on Stirner are all the more important in that they echo another hugely influential interpretation and problematization of the same topic, discussed, however, from a different standpoint: Althusser's discussion of Marx's theoretical anti-humanism, which took place virtually at the same time as Deleuze was composing his *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Althusser referred to Feuerbach's philosophy to make clear that Feuerbach's attempt to resolve the problems of German idealism by going beyond Kant and overturning Hegel ended up as an anthropology; a kind of reflection in which man takes the place of God, in Max Stirner's words.¹⁵ By the same token, Althusser emphasized the important impact that the reading of Stirner's work produced on Marx. This may have determined part of Marx's philosophical and political development. Althusser's analyses may be seen as an interpretation of the question of the death of God: they explain that in Feuerbach's philosophy the place that God leaves empty is man's for the taking.

In the 1960s, the thesis about the death of Man found its meaningful expression in Foucault's book *The Order of Things*. In the final pages of that work, published in 1966, Foucault announced that man would be extinguished if the fundamental arrangements of modern knowledge were to disappear: "If those arrangements," he writes, "were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we cannot at the moment do no more than sense the possibility – without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises – were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of the Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea."¹⁶

Foucault was showing that man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge. It is not around him and his secrets that knowledge loomed for so long in the darkness. The appearance of the concept of man as an object of investigation was not the liberation of an old anxiety, the transition into the luminous consciousness of an age-old concern, the entry into objectivity of something that had long remained trapped within beliefs and philosophies: it was the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge. Foucault showed that man is an invention of recent date —and one perhaps nearing its end.

Foucault's thesis about the death of man extended Nietzsche's proposition, inasmuch as it explained that the death of God implies the death of man. Foucault's concept developed into the space left behind by an absent God and does not call for any coming God.

In order to realize the true critique in the wake of Nietzsche's philosophy, the first step to be accomplished consists in destroying all the illusions of anthropological sleep. Foucault engaged in this trajectory from the late 1950s through to his commentary of Kant's *Anthropology*.¹⁷

Foucault explains that the web of misunderstanding and illusions in which contemporary thought is caught stems from its failure to register that anthropology speaks only the language of limitation and negativity. Because of this it cannot be made into a positive field that would serve as the basis for the human sciences. Trying to give the anthropology the positive value of a critique is part of the contemporary illusion. The nature of finitude itself has been forgotten. Hence Foucault's refusal of all anthropological investigation that defines its origins and scope by first reflecting upon man in an anthropological fashion. For this is to forget that finitude is inscribed in the relationship between the structure of truth, the phenomenon and experience, and that the analysis of it is bound up with a preliminary critique of knowledge. Having forgotten this teaching, contemporary philosophy could then essentialize finitude, give it the form of a human essence; henceforth, finitude would become the truth of truth. It is this movement that Nietzsche brings to a conclusion when he shows that the death of God implies the death of man; that the death of God signals the end of metaphysics, and that the place it leaves empty is not man's for the taking.¹⁸

The previous remarks on the connection between the death of God, the death of man, and the end of the anthropological sleep involve issues in the question of subjectivity. They imply the critique of all forms of naturalness, a concept that should be considered as the starting point for the understanding of the critique of the subject and subjectivity. Nietzsche rejects the idea of a natural humanity or an originary naturalness. Throughout his work he multiplied his critical remarks against Rousseau, for instance: "My struggle against *Rousseau's* eighteenth century, against its 'nature', its 'good man', its belief in the rule of feelings – against the softening, weakening, moralization of man."¹⁹ Nietzsche's critique does not only address the optimistic view consisting in thinking that at the beginning one finds 'good nature.' Nor is he in favor of a pessimistic view according to which, at the beginning, that is, in the state of nature, to use the contract theory terminology, 'man is a wolf to man.' Both conceptions fail to recognize the crucial issue: it is impossible to separate the humanity of human beings from the processes that engender it. It is exactly this aspect of his philosophy that will be emphasized by Foucault in an attempt to renegotiate his attitude towards Marxism.

Foucault raises important objections against a tendency (that he defines as academic Marxism), which consists in thinking that the economic or social and political conditions of existence may be reflected and expressed in the consciousness of men. According to Foucault, this form of analysis exhibits a serious defect—that of assuming that the human subject, the subject of knowledge, and forms of knowledge themselves are somehow given beforehand and definitely, and that economic, social, and political conditions of existence are laid down and imprinted on this definitely given subject²⁰.

Foucault connects here two different questions in order to develop his critique of the theory of the subject: he draws on the question of the death of God, which implies the death of man, on his account, in order to expand on the critique of the foundational subject. He calls into question an old postulate of Western philosophy (in place since Descartes) consisting in presenting the subject as the foundation, as the central core of all knowledge, as that in which and on the basis of which freedom revealed itself and truth could blossom.

On Foucault's account, Nietzsche put an end to the postulate of foundational subject with his announcement of the death of God. In fact, what is it in Western philosophy that certifies that things to be known and knowledge itself are in a relation of continuity? What assurance is there that knowledge has the ability to truly know the things of the world instead of being indefinite error, illusion, and arbitrariness? What in Western philosophy guarantees that, if not God? God is the principle that ensures a harmony between knowledge and the things to be known. To demonstrate that knowledge was really based on the things of the world, Descartes had to affirm the existence of God. If there is no relation between knowledge and the things to be known, if the relation between knowledge and known things is arbitrary; if it is a relation of power and violence, the existence of God at the centre of the system of knowledge is no longer indispensable.

If it is true that between knowledge and instinct there is only discontinuity, relations of domination and servitude, power relations, then it is not God that disappears but the subject in its unity and its sovereignty. Through Nietzsche's text one can restore the problem of the formation of a certain number of domains of knowledge on the basis of the relations of force and the political relations in society. Nietzsche means that there is not a nature of knowledge, an essence of knowledge, of the universal conditions of knowledge; rather, that knowledge is always the historical and circumstantial result of conditions outside the domain of knowledge.

Foucault shows that Nietzsche develops a type of discourse that undertakes a historical analysis of the formation of the subject itself, a historical analysis of the birth of a certain type of knowledge without ever granting the pre-existence of a subject of knowledge. Through a series of texts, from *On Truth and the Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* (1873), *Human all too Human* to *The Gay Science* and *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche explains that knowledge was invented, that knowledge is absolutely not inscribed in human nature. Knowledge does not constitute man's oldest instinct. In human behaviour, in the human appetite, there is no such thing as the seed of knowledge. Nietzsche says knowledge does have a connection with the instincts, but it cannot be present in them, and cannot even be one instinct among others. Knowledge is simply the outcome of the interplay, the encounter, the junction, the struggle, and the compromise between the instincts. Something is produced because the instincts meet, fight one another, and at the end of their battle finally reach a compromise. Conflict, combat, and the outcome of combat give rise to knowledge. Knowledge is not instinctive, it is counterinstinctive; it is not natural but counternatural. Knowledge does not really form part of human nature.

If Nietzsche denied the postulate of the foundational subject that has been a feature of modern philosophy since the time of Descartes, by the same token he was also able to destroy another anthropological model that has been peculiar to our culture

since Aristotle. The Greek philosopher had, in fact, stressed the continuity between knowledge and instincts, between knowledge and desire. According to him, desire for knowledge is universal. Men have been provided with that desire by nature. Desire for knowledge is men's peculiarity, on Aristotle's account.

However, Foucault remarks that Aristotle had to exclude knowledge of the tragic hero. In the tragedies of Sophocles and Aeschylus, the tragic hero is pushed towards knowledge not by a natural movement, but by an enigmatic word that comes from the top; by a sentence that has been pronounced by the gods and compels the hero to search for knowledge.²¹ By excluding tragic knowledge, Aristotle may assert that desire for knowledge is universally and naturally distributed among human beings.

From these analyses one understands how powerful the myth of human nature has been in our culture. Foucault had to convey the whole of Nietzschean thinking to bring an end to the questioning of man. He wrote: "For is not the death of God in effect manifested in a doubly murderous gesture which, by putting an end to the absolute, is at the same time the cause of the death of man himself? [...] The trajectory of the question *Was ist der Mensch?* in the field of philosophy reaches its end in the response which both challenges and disarms it: *der Übermensch*."²²

Notes

¹ Gilles Deleuze, "Pensée nomade," in Id. *L'île déserte et autres textes* (Paris: Les éditions de Minuit, 2002), 351–364.

² Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), esp. ch. 1.

³ Jean Wahl, *Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel* (Paris: PUF, 1951).

⁴ See Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), esp. lectures of the academic year 1937–38.

⁵ Georges Bataille, *On Nietzsche* (New York: Paragon House, 1992). See also J.–M. Besnier, "Un disciple de Kojève très turbulent," in *Magazine Littéraire*, no. 243 (June 1987): 42 and ff.

⁶ See Michel Foucault, *L'Ordre du discours. Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France prononcée le 2 décembre 1970* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 74 (translated by Rupert Sawyer as *The Discourse on Language*, appendix in M. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith [New York: Pantheon, 1972], 235).

⁷ Michel Foucault, "Interview with Michel Foucault," in Id., *Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, edited by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 1997), Vol. 3, 249.

⁸ "Interview with Michel Foucault," 241.

⁹ Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche," in Peter R. Sedgwick, *Nietzsche: A Critical Reader* (Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995), 14.

¹⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, edited by Adrian Del Caro and Roberto Pippin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5–6.

¹¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, edited by Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Book III, 119 [125], Book IV, 194 [341], 195 [342].

¹² Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 144. See also Rita Casale, "Il tragico corpo nietzscheano di Gilles Deleuze," in *Paradigmi*, no. 42 (1996): 555–592.

¹³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols*, edited by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6. See also Id., *Writings from the Late Notebooks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 83 (2[127]), 116 (5[71]), 146 (9[35]).

¹⁴ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 150–151.

¹⁵ See Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (London/New York: Verso 1996). This book, first published in 1965, is a collection of texts published elsewhere between 1960 and 1964. See in particular the texts on Feuerbach, on the young Marx, and *Marxism and Humanism*. See also, Id., *The Humanist Controversy (1967)*, in *The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings*, edited by F. Matheron, translated by G. M. Goshgarian (London/New York: Verso, 2003), 221–305.

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: an archaeology of the human sciences* (New York: Pantheon books, 1970), 387.

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, *Introduction to Kant's "Anthropology,"* edited with an Afterword and critical notes by Roberto Nigro (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008).

¹⁸ On this topic I take the liberty to refer to Roberto Nigro, "From Kant's *Anthropology* to the Critique of the Anthropological Question: Foucault's *Introduction* in Context," in Foucault, *Introduction to Kant's "Anthropology,"* 127–157.

¹⁹ See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 172; Id *Daybreak. Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 100. See also Vanessa Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 10–29, for the discussion of the Nietzschean opposition between culture and civilization.

²⁰ Michel Foucault, "Truth and Juridical Forms," in *Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, Vol. 3, edited by Robert Hurley, James D. Faubion, and Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 2000), first lecture.

²¹ These analyses were developed by Foucault in his 1971 course at the *Collège de France* “La volonté de savoir.” The course, still unpublished, explores two contrasting philosophical models: the Aristotelian and the Nietzschean. A typescript of only 73 pages is available at the Bibliothèque du Collège de France in Paris.

²² Foucault, *Introduction to Kant's "Anthropology,"* 124.

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