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Conferencia Internacional / International Conference

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Actas / Proceedings

**The Antagonism between Civilization and
Culture in Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651)**

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In Vanessa Lemm's *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy*, two different relationships between politics, aesthetics, and the future of life emerge, out of an antagonism between a politics of civilization and a politics of culture.¹ Lemm argues the processes of civilization, associated with taming and breeding, weaken the human animal, while culture, associated with cultivation and education, holds the promise of the creation of new forms of life.² In this paper, I read Nietzsche's critique of civilization in *On the Genealogy of Morality* and *On Truth in Lies in a NonMoral Sense*, as exegeses of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*. In doing so, I show that Nietzsche pursued themes of mimesis which also preoccupied Hobbes. Three achievements in the history of philosophy: Ockham's nominalism and voluntarist theology, the Copernican Reform, and Galileo's geometrization of space, leveled out the ontological hierarchy between real and appearing worlds. Both philosophers returned to the question of the relation between knowledge and power, without recourse to transcendental themes such as the realm of the ideas, or God.³

Hobbes addresses the new questions of the possibility of knowledge in the situation of the autonomy of man's reason by deploying mimesis in three different senses in *Leviathan*. In his epistemology, Hobbes refers to mimetic language use, which can be traced back to the *Cratylus*, where the interlocutors notice that words create images, giving some language use an exceptionally vivid and forceful quality.⁴ Nietzsche makes the distinction between a concept as a reified metaphor and a new metaphor, depicting the power of the new metaphor in a way that resonates with the tradition of mimetic language. The second sense in which mimesis is relevant in Hobbes's epistemology is his observations concerning the influence of anthropological mimesis on language use. Anthropological mimesis is taken up in Book III of Plato's *Republic*, where Socrates is concerned that in the absence of ideal exemplars, youth will simply imitate one another in their learning process.⁵ Anthropological mimesis affects language use because it gives rise to situations of competition, in which language use becomes a tactic in interpersonal struggle. The third sense of mimesis that is relevant to connecting Hobbes and Nietzsche, is Aristotle's definition of mimesis as the imitation of action, from the *Poetics*.⁶ This text was translated in the Renaissance, and used to teach students the logical syllogism.⁷ Hobbes aspired to organize his text logically, and the transition from the state of nature to the civil state

can be read as an emplotment of scenes, constituting the 'typical history' of the text.⁸ It is no surprise that Strauss found Hegel's struggle for recognition in *Leviathan*, because Hegel modeled his account of history in the dialectical logic of emplotment in the *Poetics*.⁹ A Hegelian emplotment of the 'typical history' from the state of nature to the civil state would count as an example of the politics of civilization. However, mimesis introduces a nondialectical instability in *Leviathan*, marking the antagonism between civilization and culture in the text. I argue Nietzsche's conclusions about mimesis spotlight the intersection between a politics of culture and a politics of civilization in *Leviathan*. Both philosophers notice mimesis as integral to the creation of values, the civilization's standard of truth, and political order. I enlist Nietzsche to argue that by relying on mimesis, Hobbes undermines the authoritarian aspirations of the *Leviathan*. Nietzsche draws the conclusion, more clearly than Hobbes, that a politics based on mimesis can never be finalized, certain, or achieve the unity of sense to which *Leviathan* aspires.

Placing mimesis at the center of the relationship between Hobbes and Nietzsche's political analyses, makes Lemm's interpretation of Nietzsche a useful lens through which to examine the political stakes of *Leviathan*. According to Lemm, the politics of civilization is in an ongoing antagonism with the politics of culture. *Leviathan*, likewise, betrays a double tendency, an alliance with civilization, and a window onto a politics of culture. After placing *Leviathan* clearly on the side of civilization, through reading *The Genealogy of Morality*, I want to explore the resources in *Leviathan* for a politics of culture. I argue that the beginning of a politics of culture, what Lemm terms 'the return to the dream life of the animal,' is to be found in Hobbes's philosophy of language. The political lessons of Nietzsche's *On Truth and Lies in a NonMoral Sense* can, in part, be found in *Leviathan*. The creative potential of new metaphors, the central theme of the mimetic language tradition, is termed differently by different authors, but in each case, political opportunity is opened up and organized by linguistic creativity. Hobbes develops his epistemology around the virtue of intuitive and linguistic perspicuity, which has the force to make others 'see' what one is saying.¹⁰ Lemm argues the drive 'pictorial thinking,' can produce a counterlanguage as part of a politics of culture, and argues that pictorial thinking is intimately related to intuitions of life, prior to human memory, and requires animal forgetting, while civilization rests on metaphors reified into abstract concepts which obscure and threaten life.¹¹ I argue that Hobbes's version of the drive to new metaphors, perspicuous language use, avails itself for the production of a counterlanguage which could contest *Leviathan*'s civilizing discourse from within.

The Covenant and *The Genealogy of Morality*

The central question of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morality*, under what conditions do men "invent value judgements of good and evil,"? is answered by *Leviathan* "at the end of the state of nature," after the escalation of enmity, when the general man finds himself social isolated and experiences life as nasty, brutish and short.¹² In the emplotment of state of nature, several scenes climax in a scene of recognition and reversal, when men recognize the general rule of reason and reverse

their ethical comportment.¹³ In the first part of the state of nature, whilst men are pursuing natural right, value judgments work strategically, to encourage allegiances, to honor or dishonor others.¹⁴ The values men pursue are related to their pursuit of their passions, which are both socially and materially contextualized.¹⁵ After the war of each against all escalates to the extreme scene in which each finds himself alone, with only an invented god to blame, men simultaneously recognize the laws of nature, which marks the invention of the value of values, and judgments of good and evil.¹⁶

The *Genealogy of Morality* reads as an exegesis of *Leviathan*, because in it, Nietzsche argues the 'reversal of the evaluating glance,' prompted by a change in attitude towards one's enemy, is another way of describing the scene of recognition and reversal in *Leviathan*.¹⁷ The enemy first is loved as a mark of distinction, then he comes to be resented.¹⁸ The emplotment of *Leviathan* unfolds from the argument that the equality of competitors leads to enmity.

From this equal ability, ariseth an equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another.¹⁹

This passage suggests the development of scenes of the state of nature. The extreme scene of the state of nature, in which life is nasty, brutish and short, can be distinguished from an earlier scene in which men are not isolated, nor enemies, but rivals who engage in the anti-social sociality of constant measuring of themselves against others. The extreme scene is not a social one, but reads as a post-battle scene, "where every man is Enemy to everyman; the same is cosnequent to the time, wherin men live without other security, than what their own strength and own invention shall furnish them withall."²⁰ Making known the will to contend by battle sufficiently known, amounts to the Hobbesian man's taking his enemy too seriously, tipping the scale from respect to resentment.²¹

The action of *Leviathan*, the turning point from the state of nature to the civil state, is the moment the future subject-citizen of the Hobbesian commonwealth recognizes the laws of nature, or 'right reason' and reverses his ethical comportment in accordance with them.²² The 'reversal of the evaluating glance' is marked by a difference in ethos between the pursuit of natural right, and the recognition of the laws of nature. The laws of nature express the norms undergirding the rule of law, and the norms they express are those of Christian charity.²³ Covenanting for the civil state, counts as a civilizing process in Lemm's interpretation of Nietzsche, because it is a rationalizing and moralizing process. *Leviathan* requires an "economy of civilization" because its "aim is the self-preservation of the group at the cost of normalizing the individual."²⁴ Since the *Leviathan* sets up the liberal rule of law, and emphasizes contract, the emerging tool of capitalism, it presages if not depicts the emergence of a "form of political life based on domination and exploitation of humans by humans."²⁵

The second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, also reads as an exegesis of *Leviathan*. Nietzsche discusses the need to become regular, reliable, consistent person,

in order to be answerable for one's own future.²⁶ Likewise, in *Leviathan* a spectacle holds untrustworthy men in awe, or guarantees they will always agree with their covenanting self.²⁷ Christian charity as an ethic, valorizes the regularity and predictability of reciprocal social relations, as does the rule of law.²⁸ Since the sovereign enforces the civil laws which express the laws of nature, the commonwealth is artificed on the ground of man's predictability and regularity and attempts to enforce these norms.²⁹ When Nietzsche suggests man's predictability is rooted in the fact that his promises are based on the memory of pain, he criticizes the Hobbesian citizens, who made a promise based on the painful memory of the extreme stage of the state of nature.³⁰ The Hobbesian peace is an exemplar of the politics of civilization insofar as the peace is fully secured. Nietzsche issues a damning proclamation against the modern state when he writes: "A system of law conceived...as a means against fighting in general,... this would be a principle hostile to life, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of fatigue and a secret path to nothingness."³¹ In aspiring to rationalize, normalize, and control the doctrines heard in public as well as language in its politically vital senses, *Leviathan* clearly aspires to a politics of civilization in order to secure the unity of the authority of state.

However, the commonwealth depicted in *Leviathan* is not an everlasting power but a "mortal god."³² The office of sovereignty itself is historically vulnerable because the civilizational force of the commonwealth can be disrupted from within according to the logic of the right of resistance. Resistance arises from the citizen's opinion that the sovereign does not save, or secure his life, but threatens it.³³ In my view, Hobbes's acknowledgement of the right of resistance means the citizen can get a perspective on what it means to 'preserve his life' that is not the same as the sovereign's definition of its ability to secure life.³⁴ The right of resistance returns to the ground of the covenant, and so stands at the intersection of *Leviathan's* politics of civilization and politics of culture. Hobbes's philosophy of language, examined through a Nietzschean lens, shows that the sovereign's ability to secure life can be turned from a proposition of legitimation back into a question by any perspicuous fancy.

Perspicuity and *On Truth and Lies in a NonMoral Sense*

Hobbes and Nietzsche's both belong to the tradition of mimetic language informed by nominalism, the argument against the scholastic concept of "substance," the Aristotelian scholastic version of the mysterious "thing in itself."³⁵ Since Ockham argued against substance, there was no prevailing account of the objective reality expressed in language.³⁶ Instead, what is named is a subjective sensation, and the name lacks a necessary connection to the metaphysical status of the thing.³⁷ Hobbes's nominalism is apparent in his explanation of universals and in his reiteration that "true and false are attributes of Speech not of Things."³⁸ Hobbes refers to the Greek term *fancy* to describe the mechanico-materialist perception in sense experience, in a way that accords with nominalism.³⁹ "And though at some certain distance, the reall, and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; Yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another."⁴⁰ *Fancy*, Hobbes's term for the capturing of images in intuitive or empirical perception is later described as the faculty of the imagination.⁴¹

Hobbes's view of knowledge as beginning in empirical experience in conjunction with the mechanics of the body, is echoed by Nietzsche's description of the "nerve stimulus".⁴² Nietzsche explains the translation of mental discourse into verbal, or cognition into language. "To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor."⁴³

Hobbes's account of fancy covers both moments identified by Nietzsche. Hobbes has a mechanical explanation for the formation of an image in the mind, and a nominalist explanation of naming that image. The roles of the 'fancy' travel over the mechanico-materialist account of perception, and the nominalist view of language. 'Perspicuous' applies to both roles of fancy because it describes clear intuition and refers to the similitude formed by the fancy, when it finds the word for the image.⁴⁴ Perspicuous language means lucid naming of one's sensory perceptions, in which a man begets a like conception in another, or makes him 'see' what one is saying.⁴⁵ David Johnston argues, "A perspicuous discourse, is also, he implies, an efficacious one, because it creates the kind of forceful impression that does not quickly fade."⁴⁶ Hobbes values perspicuous language use because of its powerful effect; it carries a didactic force, and has the force to create agreement.⁴⁷

The agreement on terms which marks the Hobbesian peace, for Nietzsche, means that the imagistic language which once expressed lived intuition or pictorial thinking, has hardened into concepts due to regular and consistent use. Names become rigid and overly general.

Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases—which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal.⁴⁸

The metaphor which originally illuminated lived experience, becomes a concept which reoccupies the position of the mysterious thing in itself. The reification of a similitude into a concept distances language from truth. "Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force..."⁴⁹ When Nietzsche describes a "peace treaty" which puts an end to the war of each against all, he elaborates that the role of the sovereign definer, to create a distinction between true and false. "That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth. For the contrast between truth and lie arises here for the first time."⁵⁰ What Nietzsche terms "the legislation of language," an attempt to enforce the distinction between truth and lies echoes the role of the sovereign definer. According to Nietzsche's interpretation of the effects of the legislation of language, the rational citizen "will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. First he universalizes all these impressions into less colorful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to them."⁵¹ In *Leviathan*, the rationalization of the future subject citizen occurs when he recognizes the laws of nature, which are the moral precepts to which he ought to entrust the guidance

of his conduct. For Nietzsche and Hobbes, dissolving the image into a concept is part of the rationalization and normalization required for political order.

For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: ... the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked boundaries---a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world.⁵²

Since the project of *Leviathan* is to show how future subject citizens can generate a regulative and imperative world, through the imposition of a sovereign definer, Nietzsche's explanation of schemata elaborates how an organized society can result from within the epistemological framework of nominalism. For Nietzsche, obedience to a sovereign definer would amount to a dedication to lie, because truth is closer to illusion, the illusion that originated the metaphor, before it became a schema or a concept.⁵³ A law abiding citizen, or a citizen who abides by the sovereign's judgment of doctrines and opinions, is a dedicated liar, because he converses in the currency of concepts instead of the world of vivid first impressions. In order to obey the sovereign, the citizen must forget the origins of his genius of construction, he must forget that "he himself is an artistically creating subject."⁵⁴

The Politics of Culture

In Nietzsche's view, however, the drive to the formation of new metaphors means that any "rigid and regular" political world is subject to further refashioning.

It seeks a new realm and another channel for its activity, and it finds this in myth and in art generally. This drive continually confuses the conceptual categories and cells by bringing forward new transferences, metaphors and metonymies. It continually manifest an ardent desire to refashion the world which presents itself to waking man, so that it will be as colorful, irregular, lacking in results and coherence, charming, and eternally new as the world of dreams.⁵⁵

For Nietzsche, the dissolution of images into concepts may turn citizens into liars but it does not eliminate the drive to pictorial thinking. If new metaphors are possible through subject-citizen perspicuous language use, then perhaps a dedicated liar of the Hobbesian commonwealth could return to his first impressions and dismantle the schemata authorized by the sovereign. Hobbes notices pictorial thinking can hamper the sovereign's ability to keep the peace.

Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but only sometimes awake the Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion,

are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually.⁵⁶

The “sudden and rough busling in of a new Truth” which awakens the war, is, in my view, a reference to the force of a new image arising from perspicuous language use, a new metaphor. Hobbes suggests that the force of the new metaphor is to introduce an opinion, that the sovereign does not save one’s life but threatens it, defining the war within the peace. The conclusion I draw from Hobbes’s solution to linguistic discord, the sovereign definer, and his argument that a new truth might yet bustle in, is that perspicuous language is problematic for the end of a unified state. The sovereign, even as legislator on language use, cannot control the citizens’ ability to reawaken the war, or tip the antagonism towards a politics of culture by disrupting the concepts that form the building blocks of civilization. While perspicuous language use garners consensus, and so is central to the project of the creation of order, it also can disrupt the agreement implicit in concepts or schemata. *Leviathan’s* citizen can change from “answerable for his future” to naming his “singular Passions,” “parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation.”⁵⁷ If the Hobbesian subject citizen continues to feel the drive to new metaphors, then, following Nietzsche, he could remember he is an artistically creating subject, disagree, resist, and fashion a political community that is not a sovereign state.⁵⁸

Hobbes’s acknowledgement of the problem of the right of resistance suggests an antagonism between civilizational and counter-civilization politics could emerge within the modern state. The significance of the ongoing possibility of perspicuity or mimetic language use by the subject-citizens in *Leviathan*, is that it constitutes how the war within the peace can demand acknowledgement. Lemm terms Nietzsche’s “drive to new metaphors” pictorial thinking. According to Lemm, the creation of a new metaphor, which creates a counterlanguage disrupting the politics of civilization, requires a return to animality.

Hobbes acknowledges a continuity of animality and humanity in generation of a new similitude. According to Hobbes, the translation of mental discourse into verbal, requiring the fancy to create a new similitude, is an activity that amounts to the animal imagination, being raised in words to the human understanding. *Leviathan* notes that using language to nominate sense experience distinguishes man from beast. Lemm points out that this same activity does not advance man away from beast but actually requires a return to animal silence, the moment of contingency between word and image.⁵⁹ The translation of mental discourse into verbal figures a continuity between animality and humanity, because trains of mental discourse are attributed to man’s animality, so language use overlies man’s animality, rather than definitively breaking from it. While the language use is peculiar to the human, language translates a train of thoughts rooted in animality, so that man is animal on both sides of the covenant.

Besides a continuity between animality and humanity, Lemm interprets the drive to new metaphors to involve animal forgetting and illusion. Animal forgetting, means returning to the immediacy of lived experience.⁶⁰ This immediacy can be termed the dream life because it runs counter to the civilizational reality.⁶¹ A return to the immediacy of intuition can also be termed illusion, because it is false with respect to the ‘truth’ of the civilizing rule.⁶² At first glance, Hobbes’s account of perspicuous language

differs from this view, because for Hobbes, a new metaphor may come from the memory, which is a storehouse of images from lived experience.⁶³ However, Hobbes does think that all perspicuous language is directly tied to lived experience, as the 'return to animal illusion' requires, because for Hobbes it is wrong to speak of things of which one has not had direct intuition.⁶⁴ For Hobbes, then, the memory holds much more than the memory of the pain or extreme scene of the state of nature, so it has resources that extend beyond what Nietzsche terms the memory of the will. According to Lemm, Nietzsche's analysis of the memory argues that it pushes forward towards concepts "by making equivalent that which is non-equivalent."⁶⁵ For Hobbes, the work of the fancy as a storehouse of images, prepares a subject citizen to form new and rare similitudes, which are not necessarily equivalences.⁶⁶

By acknowledging the problem of the right of resistance, Hobbes admits that the sovereign definer could be vulnerable to a new truth busling in, or the power of mimetic language to bring disorder as well as order. Resistance suggests a citizen may return to the civilizing language of the covenant and reevaluate it. How they would express that reevaluation would be in perspicuous language, but to consider resistance means to reconsider *Leviathan's* mimesis in the sense of its imitation of action. A future subject citizen covenants because he recognizes he can preserve his life only by neutralizing his life-threatening enmities. Imagining an extreme scene of total isolation, the covenanter decides not to resist an artificed sovereign and covenants with others, each mutually pledging non-resistance.⁶⁷ Man saves his own life by authorizing a power to threaten it, to enforce the covenant. While the original role of the threatening sovereign is to unify the powers of each individual, if the sovereign picks out a citizen and in fact threatens his life, the individual will resist.⁶⁸

In the original covenant, he transfigures the threat of the other's 'will to contend by battle' into a sovereign threat. Upon re-evaluation, he may decide that the threat of the rival is more tolerable than the threat that could potentially arise from the sovereign. He could come to this decision out of a scepticism about the inevitability of his rivalries turning into enmities, and enmities into a war of each against all. The subject citizen who re-evaluates the logic of covenant may question the emplotment of scenes in *Leviathan*, doubting the necessity by which its scenes follow one another, to resist the conclusion that sovereignty is the necessary outcome of the state of nature. In the space of the right of resistance, citizens of the *Leviathan* can rethink what it means to secure or preserve their own life, possibly coming to the Nietzschean conclusion that the preservation of life requires the pluralization of its forms.

Notes

¹ Vanessa Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy: Culture Politics, and the Animality of the Human Being* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 3.

² Ibid.

³ Noel Malcolm, "Thomas Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology" (PhD Dissertation, Cambridge, 1982). Hans Blumenberg, *The Genesis of the Copernican World*, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987). Alexandre Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*, Publications of the Institute of the History of Medicine, the Johns Hopkins University. 3d Ser.: The Hideyo Noguchi Lectures, V. 7 (Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).

⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1998), 4301-31d.

⁵ ———, *The Republic*, ed. GRF Ferrari, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 330d-31a.

⁶ Aristotle, Seth Benardete, and Michael Davis, *Aristotle on Poetics* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2002), 1450a35.

⁷ Terence Cave, *Recognitions : A Study in Poetics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988), 73-75. Cave uses the example of Riccoboni as a Renaissance humanist who taught logic with the *Poetics*.

⁸ Thomas Hobbes and Richard Tuck, *Leviathan*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 35.

⁹ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Anne Paolucci, and Henry Paolucci, *Hegel on Tragedy* (Smyrna, DE: Griffon House Pub., 2001). Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes : Its Basis and Its Genesis* ([Chicago]: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 57. Strauss uses the J.B. Baillie translation of the *Phenomenology of Mind* for his example of a recognition scene.

¹⁰ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 11, 16 36, 50, 51.

¹¹ Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy*, 7.

¹² Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Keith Ansell-Pearson, and Carol Diethe, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5. Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 89.

¹³ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 91.

¹⁴ Ibid., Chapter 10.

¹⁵ Ibid., Chapter 6, material constitution, Chapter 10, social constitution.

¹⁶ Ibid., 76 corresponds to p.89.

¹⁷ Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson, and Diethe, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 22.

¹⁸ Ibid., 24.

¹⁹ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 87.

²⁰ Ibid., 89.

²¹ Ibid., 70, 88. Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson, and Diethe, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 23.

²² Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 92.

²³ Ibid., 109.

²⁴ Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy*, 5.

²⁵ Ibid., 6. C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford,: Clarendon Press, 1962).

²⁶ Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson, and Diethe, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 39.

²⁷ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 120.

²⁸ Ibid., 106.

²⁹ Ibid., 102, 20.

³⁰ Ibid., 89. Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson, and Diethe, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 41, 42.

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- ³¹ Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson, and Diethel, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 54.
- ³² Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 120.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, 206.
- ³⁴ Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson, and Diethel, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 12.
- ³⁵ Nietzsche and Breazeale, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," 82.
- ³⁶ Malcolm, "Thomas Hobbes and Voluntarist Theology", 13, 14.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.* Michael Allen Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 23.
- ³⁸ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 36.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.
- ⁴¹ In the imagination, Hobbes combines direct experience and memory, which Nietzsche separates more carefully because he argues, they exert force in opposition to one another.
- ⁴² Nietzsche and Breazeale, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," 81.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 82.
- ⁴⁴ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 36, 37, 50, 51.
- ⁴⁵ Thomas Hobbes and Ferdinand Tönnies, *The Elements of Law, Natural & Politic*, Cambridge English Classics (Cambridge [Eng.]: The University Press, 1928), 64. . Perspicuity also refers to the organization of a discourse as a whole, meaning a discourse that is organized well enough to be followed by others.
- ⁴⁶ David Johnston and Thomas Hobbes, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan : Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation*, Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 19.
- ⁴⁷ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 11.
- ⁴⁸ Nietzsche and Breazeale, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," 83.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 84.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 81.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 84.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 89.
- ⁵³ Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy*, 25.
- ⁵⁴ Nietzsche and Breazeale, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," 86.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 89.
- ⁵⁶ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 124-25.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 55.
- ⁵⁸ Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson, and Diethel, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 39. Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 55.
- ⁵⁹ Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy*, 8.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 155.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 4.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, 12.
- ⁶³ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 16.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.
- ⁶⁵ Lemm, *Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy*, 117.
- ⁶⁶ Hobbes and Tuck, *Leviathan*, 51.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 92.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 151.

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