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Nietzsche, Nature, and the Affirmation of Life
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Nietzsche's critique of the Western tradition is gathered in the claim that "the fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is *the faith in opposite values* (BGE 2). Our religious and philosophical belief systems have operated by dividing reality into a set of binary opposites, such as eternity and time, permanence and change, reason and passion—which can be organized under the headings of being and becoming. The motivation behind such divisional thinking is as follows: Becoming names the negative, unstable, dynamic conditions of existence that undermine our interest in grasping, controlling, and preserving life (because of the pervasive force of error, mystery, variability, destruction, and death). Being, as *opposite* to becoming, permits the governance or exclusion of negative conditions and the attainment of various forms of stability untainted by their fluid contraries.

In restoring legitimacy to conditions of becoming, Nietzsche advances what I call an *existential naturalism*. The finite, unstable dynamic of earthly existence—and its meaningfulness—becomes the measure of thought, to counter various attempts in philosophy and religion to "reform" lived experience by way of a rational, spiritual, or moral "transcendence" that purports to rectify an originally flawed condition (GS 109; TI 3, 16). In turning to "the basic text of *homo natura*" (BGE 230), Nietzsche is not restricting his philosophy to what we would call scientific naturalism, which in many ways locates itself on the "being" side of the ledger. For Nietzsche, nature is more "wild and crazy" than science would allow; it includes forces, instincts, passions, and powers that are not reducible to objective, scientific categories. Retrieving the more primal sense of nature displayed in early Greek culture, Nietzsche insists that "the terrible (*schreckliche*) basic text of nature must again be recognized" (BGE 230). Nietzsche's naturalism is consonant with scientific naturalism in rejecting "supernatural" beliefs, yet these beliefs are not "errors" in the strict sense but perspectival contestants for "meaning." The source of supernatural beliefs, for Nietzsche, stems not from a lack or refusal of scientific thinking, but from an aversion to overwhelming and disintegrating forces in nature that science too suppresses and wants to overcome. At the same time, Nietzsche also rejects a romantic naturalism, which spurns science and calls for a return to an original condition of harmony with nature (GS 370). Naturalism, for Nietzsche, amounts to a kind of philosophical methodology, in that natural forces of becoming will be deployed to redescribe and account for all aspects of life, including cultural formations, even the emergence of seemingly antinatural constructions of

“being.” The focus for this deployment can be located in Nietzsche’s concept of will to power, to be discussed shortly. First, I want to give some historical background for a discussion of naturalism, and then locate the historical focus for Nietzsche’s naturalistic turn, namely the death of God.

The History of Nature

To understand Nietzsche’s naturalism it is helpful to begin with a brief excursion into the history of the words “nature” and “natural.” For most philosophers today, including a number of Nietzsche interpreters, naturalism is shorthand for scientific naturalism, wherein philosophical topics are best explained by, or at least must be consistent with, findings in natural science. Analytic philosophers often complain that continental philosophy is bereft of precision and commitment to scientific reason. Continental philosophers often complain that analytic philosophy takes for granted terms or criteria that are not timeless but rather historically emergent and that thus at least are worthy of questioning. Nature is a good example. (Full disclosure: I am a continental philosopher.) One might think that our sense of physical nature is nicely collected in the Greek word *phusis*, usually translated as nature; but this word had a much more complex meaning for the Greeks. *Phusis* is derived from the verb *phuō*, meaning to grow, to bring forth, to give birth. In Homer, *phuō* usually refers to plant life, with a specific meaning of bringing forth shoots, and earth is commonly called *phusizoos*, that which gives forth life (*Odyssey* 11, 301). With Aristotle we get a philosophical articulation of *phusis* as nature, but here too we have to be careful. Aristotle does not equate *phusis* with physical matter; *phusis* is manifest more in form than in matter (*Physics* 193b5ff). And a prime instance of *phusis*, for Aristotle, is *psuchē*, life, including the human soul (*On the Soul* 412a20ff). *Phusis* is not contrasted with the “supernatural.” It is simply identified with movement and change (*Physics* 200b12) and is specified as self-manifesting movement, as contrasted with *technē*, artifice, or movement caused by an external agent in human production (192b10ff). The only sense in which Aristotle’s conception of *phusis* could be distinguished from something “supernatural” is in the sense that sublunar natural movement does not admit of the permanence of the divine sphere; nature is the realm of temporal becoming as opposed to the eternal being of divinity. But to repeat, Aristotelian *phusis* is not strictly material because it includes a teleological principle of form; as distinct from the pure actuality of divine form, *phusis* exhibits a system of “dynamic” forms in the process of actualization.

In this way Aristotle blends two meanings in his understanding of *phusis*: self-manifesting movement and “essence,” together indicating a kind of dynamic process of actualization indicated in his primary concepts of *dunamis* and *energeia*. Given that the manifestations of *phusis* display repeatable regularities, the “essentialist” meaning of *phusis* took shape in contradistinction to the manifest variety of cultural beliefs, gathered in the term *nomos*. It should be noted that Aristotle does not completely subscribe to the binary of nature and culture, especially since cultural capacities of the soul like *technē* and *phronēsis* are natural (*pephukos*) to the soul (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1139a11). The same holds for the binary of *phusis* as an invariant order and *nomos* as the variance of

convention: For Aristotle, sublunar nature, especially human nature, can admit of variance, even development that conflicts with erstwhile nature (*NE* 1134b18-35; *Politics* 1332a4ff).

In sum, an understanding of nature and the natural can unfold from a number of distinctions that do not reduce to a common form: natural-permanent, natural-artificial, natural-cultural, natural-accidental, and natural-supernatural. The last distinction in our sense was not operative in Greek thought; it emerged in modern thought, in part because of the complicated role of Christian theology in European philosophy. In general, the modern philosophical concept of nature developed out of two guiding criteria in modern science that, despite their apparent divergence into empirical and conceptual standards, were reciprocally related in scientific work: experimental verification and mathematical formalization. Both Descartes and Kant, among others, insisted that a science of nature was grounded in mathematics.² Modern science was a self-conscious repudiation of Aristotelian “physics,” in part because central Aristotelian concepts of *telos* and *dunamis* eluded precise formalization and verification. As Newton put it, “the moderns, rejecting substantial forms and occult qualities, have endeavored to subject the phenomena of nature to the laws of mathematics.”³ And Descartes described his *Meditations* as the foundation of his physics, which deals a mortal blow to Aristotelian physics.⁴ Consequently, in modern science, “nature” is no longer understood in an Aristotelian manner as the field of self-manifesting phenomena that guide inquiry according to their evident formations, but as re-formed phenomena according to a priori constructs and principles that are *not* evident in immediate experience. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes claims that corporeal things in nature exist, but their true existence cannot be ascertained as a match with our sensory grasp (as in Aristotle), because sense experience can be confused. Things in nature exist only in the manner of clear and distinct ideas, which are ultimately grounded in pure mathematics, which is the ground of mechanical physics, and which, for Descartes, is ultimately guaranteed by God.⁵

Although many early modern philosophical and scientific developments were not divorced from theological principles, our contemporary understanding of naturalism can be called a deletion of any such principles and a reduction to a core of empirical and mathematical methods and constructions. Now I turn to the historical locus of Nietzsche’s naturalistic turn, the death of God.

The Death of God

Nietzsche advances the death of God through the figure of a madman (*GS* 125), whose audience is not religious believers, but nonbelievers who are chastised for not facing the consequences of God’s demise. Since God is the ultimate symbol of transcendence and foundations, his death is to be praised, but its impact reaches far beyond religion. In the modern world God is no longer the mandated centerpiece of intellectual and cultural life. But historically the notion of God had been the warrant for all sorts of cultural constructs in moral, political, philosophical, even scientific domains—so the death of God is different from atheism, since divinity had been “living” as a powerful productive force. From Plato through to the Enlightenment, a divine mind had

been the ultimate reference point for origins and truth. With the eclipse of God, all corollary constructs must fall as well (*TI* 9, 5). The death of God therefore announces the demise of truth, or at least that “the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a *problem*” (*GM* III, 27). Even though God is no longer at the forefront of culture, we still have confidence in the “shadows” of God (*GS* 108), in supposedly secular truths that have nonetheless lost their pedigree and intellectual warrant. One of these “shadows” would be the modern confidence in scientific naturalism, which historically took shape by way of theological and metaphysical constructs purportedly dismissed by science.

The consequences of God’s death are enormous because of the specter of nihilism, the loss of meaning and intelligibility. The secular sophistication of the modern world has unwittingly “unchained this earth from its sun,” so that we are “straying as through an infinite nothing” (*GS* 125). The course of Western thought has led it to turn away from its historical origins, but the unsuspected result has been that “the highest values devalue themselves” (*WP* 2) and we are faced with a stark choice: either we collapse into nihilism or we rethink the world in naturalistic terms freed from the reverence for being-constructs.

The complex question of nihilism in Nietzsche’s thought cannot be addressed here. What can be said is that the threat of nihilism—the denial of any truth, meaning, or value in the world—is in fact parasitic on the Western tradition, which has judged conditions of becoming in life to be deficient and has “nullified” these conditions in favor of rational, spiritual, or moral corrections. If, in the wake of the death of God, the loss of these corrections is experienced as nihilistic, it is because the traditional models are still presumed to be the only measures of truth, meaning, and value—and thus the world seems empty without them (*WP* 12A). For Nietzsche, philosophers can embrace the death of God with gratitude and excitement, not despair, because of the opening of new horizons for thought (*GS* 343). Various motifs in Nietzsche’s texts can be read as anti-nihilistic attempts to rethink truth, meaning, and value in naturalistic terms, in a manner consistent with conditions of becoming. A central motif in this regard is will to power.

Will to Power

“The world viewed from inside . . . would be ‘will to power’ and nothing else” (*BGE* 36). A world of becoming, for Nietzsche, cannot simply be understood as a world of change. Movements are always *related* to other movements and the relational structure is not simply expressive of differences, but rather resistances and tensional conflicts (*WP* 568). Will to power depicts in dynamic terms the idea that any affirmation is also a negation, that any condition or assertion of meaning must overcome some “Other,” some obstacle or counterforce. Nietzsche proclaims something quite important for understanding his concept of power: “will to power can manifest itself *only* against resistances; therefore it *seeks* that which resists it” (*WP* 656; my emphasis). What is crucial here is the following: Since power can *only* involve resistance, then one’s power to overcome is essentially related to a counter-power; if resistance were eliminated, if one’s counter-power were destroyed or even neutralized by sheer domination, one’s power would evaporate, it would no longer *be* power. Power is *overcoming* something, not annihilating it: “there is no annihilation in the sphere of spirit” (*WP* 588). Will to

power, therefore, cannot be understood in terms of individual states alone, even successful states, because it names a tensional force-field, *within which* individual states shape themselves by seeking to overcome other sites of power. Power cannot be construed as “instrumental” for any resultant state, whether it be knowledge, pleasure, purpose, even survival, since such conditions are epiphenomena of power, of a drive to overcome something (*GM* II, 12, 18). For this reason, Nietzsche depicts life as “that which must always overcome itself” (*Z* II, 12). This accounts for Nietzsche’s objections to measuring life by “happiness,” because the structure of will to power shows that *dissatisfaction* and *displeasure* are intrinsic to movements of overcoming (*WP* 696, 704), and so conditions of sheer satisfaction would dry up the energies of life.

In historical terms, we can notice interesting links between will to power and Aristotle’s conception of nature as *phusis*. We noted that modern physics departed from Aristotle in that the *being* of nature is reduced to precise, stable references of mathematical structure and the immediate findings of empirical verification—all this counterposed to Aristotelian physics and its dependence on developmental concepts of potentiality and purpose (*dunamis* and *telos*), both of which “exceed” immediate conditions of actuality. If Aristotelian *phusis* can be understood as a dynamic force of development, and *dunamis* is understood, as it was by Aristotle, as *capacious* potentiality—i.e., not simply possibility, but potency, capacity, and power—then Nietzschean will to power can be seen as a radicalization of Aristotelian *phusis* and *dunamis*. For Nietzsche, “natural powers” would no longer follow Aristotle’s proviso that they are developments toward actualities inscribed in reality by being fixed in divine form—which underwrites Aristotle’s ultimate metaphysical principle that “actuality is prior to potentiality” (*Metaphysics* 1072a9). With will to power, Nietzsche turns this principle around: all actualization of form emerges within an irreducible force of power-relations. With the death of God, natural forms can no longer be traced to any “supra-dynamic” divine actuality. And Nietzsche’s “physics” of will to power names the priority of dynamic force over *all* conceptions of actual being, whether ancient or modern.

Psychology and Perspectivism in Philosophy

A central feature of Nietzsche’s naturalism, which distinguishes it from scientific naturalism, is that his diagnosis of the philosophical tradition goes beyond a conceptual critique of beliefs and theories: “the path to fundamental problems” is to be found in psychology (*BGE* 23). Nietzsche maintains that the origins of problematic constructs of “being” are not to be found in mistaken beliefs but in psychological weakness in the face of a finite world, an *aversion* to the negative conditions of life, which he describes as “decadence, a symptom of the *decline of life*” (*TI* 3, 6). Thus a certain kind of psychological strength is needed to affirm life and rethink it in ways that are more appropriate to its natural conditions of becoming.

Notable in this respect is Nietzsche’s account of the ascetic ideal in the Third Essay of *GM*. There the ascetic ideal names the life-denying impulse that renounces the conditions of natural existence—which is taken to be meaningless on its own terms—and aims for transcendent salvation. Surprisingly, Nietzsche declares that modern science is the latest and most potent form of the ascetic ideal, not because it shares a

belief in religious transcendence, but because it maintains a belief in truth (*GM III, 24*). In *GS 344*, Nietzsche had implicitly connected the modern commitment to truth with the ascetic ideal: A faith in scientific truth, for example, “*thus affirms another world* from the one of life, nature, and history.” The belief in science “is still based on a *metaphysical faith*”—which we recall is manifested in binary-thinking, and which in this case would involve a secured scientific model of *truth* over against the *errors* of non-scientific thinking.

In *GM III, 25* Nietzsche concludes that science is not the genuine *natural* opponent of the ascetic ideal because in the matter of truth it is likewise alienated from the unstable forces of natural life. He then seeks to clarify how two seemingly different standpoints—asceticism and science—can yet share a common ideal. Religious asceticism is simply the most obvious and telling manifestation of the deeper issue animating Nietzsche’s critical project: the diagnosis of life-alienating forces in human culture; *this* is the central meaning of the ascetic ideal, whatever form it takes. Obviously modern science—in both its history and practice—has been antagonistic toward religion and transcendent doctrines in its drive for cultural authority. Yet Nietzsche insists that even with this contested relationship, science is still a manifestation of the *core* meaning of the ascetic ideal:

Its opposition and battle are, on closer inspection, directed not at the ideal itself but at its outer-works, its apparel and disguise, at the way the ideal temporarily hardens, solidifies, becomes dogmatic.

Nietzsche then indicates how science is indeed more attuned to life than the transcendent versions of the ascetic ideal: “science liberates what life is in it by denying what is exoteric in this ideal.” In other words, science opposes the “overt” manifestations of religion—its doctrines, theologies, and life-styles—that do in fact stand in the way of something like science. Yet with respect to the core meaning of the ideal—which in this context could be called “esoteric” or “covert”—Nietzsche declares: “Both of them, science and the ascetic ideal, are still on the same foundation.” And right away he identifies this common foundation with the matter of truth:

that is to say, both overestimate truth (more correctly: they share the same faith that truth *cannot* be assessed or criticized), and this makes them both *necessarily* allies, so that, if they must be fought, they can only be fought and called into question together. An assessment of the value of the ascetic ideal inevitable brings about an assessment of the value of science.

After Nietzsche offers a provocative parenthetical remark about art being a better nominee for opposing the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche elaborates on how the alliance of science and asceticism can be understood in specific ways. The discussion focuses mainly on two elements: 1) How the practices and epistemological assumptions in science show a comparable antagonism toward more natural drives; and 2) How certain results of the modern scientific world-view have reinforced or reconstituted a central

feature of the ascetic ideal: that natural life on its own terms exhibits no intrinsic meaning.

To the first point, Nietzsche briefly discusses the way in which scientific knowledge must fight off a host of natural dispositions, passions, and instincts in order to shape its aim toward an objective, disinterested understanding of nature, which is presumed to give truth that is independent of human interests and freed from the disorder and contingencies of lived experience. Despite the different spheres of *content* in science and religious asceticism (“natural” and “supernatural” spheres), when it comes to scientific criteria and the “discipline” required for training in science, Nietzsche asks us to notice a form of self-denial that is comparable to an ascetic denial of natural life impulses. This is why Nietzsche says that “science rests on the same base as the ascetic ideal: the precondition of both the one and the other is a certain *impoverishment of life*.”

The second point requires some care in interpretation, and I think it is best viewed in light of the death of God, although here there emerges a different angle on its consequences. We have already noted that the eclipse of God in modern thought also threatens its “shadows,” the supposedly secular beliefs that in fact have lost their historical anchor—thus the threat of full-blown nihilism. Nietzsche’s analysis in *GM* compresses this scenario into the problem of truth. According to Nietzsche, scientific truth is simply a modification of theological binaries, and so the modern displacement of God will have to deauthorize scientific confidences about knowledge. Yet in *GM* III, 25, Nietzsche pushes the science-asceticism equation even further, now in the light of asceticism’s overt conviction about the meaninglessness of natural life, on its incapacity to find meaning on life’s own terms.

Nietzsche continues to conflate the supposed differences between science and asceticism by taking up the “famous *victories*” of modern science over theology and religious world-views. There surely *are* such victories, he says, but they do not support the familiar binary-story of “natural science” overcoming and replacing “supernatural” beliefs. Nietzsche asks: Over *what* has science been victorious? Not the ascetic *ideal* but only certain of its trappings.

The ascetic ideal was decidedly not conquered, it was, on the contrary, made stronger, I mean more elusive, more spiritual (*geistiger*), more insidious by the fact that science constantly and unsparingly detached and broke off a wall or outer-work that had attached itself to it and *coarsened* its appearance.

In what follows Nietzsche elaborates on an *ideal* shared by asceticism and science—despite the “outward” battle between their world-views—and this ideal has to do with the meaninglessness of finite life, with the nihilistic erasure of meaning in the lived world. How can this be, when science deliberately separates itself from world-transcending beliefs and considers itself to be a highly meaningful endeavor? Nietzsche brings in the example of astronomy and asks if we can truly say that the Copernican defeat of theological astronomy was a defeat of the ascetic ideal. He thinks not, and it is here that the matter of a shared nihilism comes into play and the full complexity of the death of God is shown. If the modern alternative to God’s eclipse is simply modern

science, then Nietzsche seems to think that the nihilistic core of the ascetic ideal has not only been sustained, but even strengthened, because it can now rest on much more evident and “natural” grounds (and therefore no longer require a supernatural script).

We might comprehend Nietzsche’s move by recalling the self-conception of modern science as a radical transformation of how nature is to be understood by way of mechanical physics. The new mechanical model of nature was thoroughly dependent on mathematical measures, which could provide the maximal degree of “objectivity,” and which could not be compatible with less measurable or immeasurable matters such as purposes and values (goodness, beauty, goals, etc.). This is the source of the famous fact-value divide, where nature is viewed as a value-free set of measurable facts and values are no longer intrinsic to nature (as they were in ancient and medieval thought). Nature is now simply matter motion measured by a quantified space-time grid; nature as such has no aim or purpose. The location of *values* therefore had to be redirected to the human subject—whether in the personal subjectivity of “taste” or in the transcendental subjectivity of universal principles intrinsic to any rational mind (as attempted by Kant). Yet in either case, values could no longer be attributed to natural “reality” because they were now “merely” subjective states projected “upon” objective nature (a sunset is not “really” beautiful; it only appears so to us). As a consequence, the status of certain meanings was not only sectioned off but also demoted to the point where it would be possible to say that human life is not “really” meaningful in the sphere of nature. Such, I think, is the context in which we can comprehend Nietzsche’s subsequent remarks about astronomy in particular and science in general.

The reason why Nietzsche challenges the victory of Copernican over theological astronomy is that the ascetic departure from natural meaning no longer requires a supernatural story because in effect it has perfected an *immanent* departure from natural meaning *within* a natural setting.

Has man perhaps become less *needful* of a transcendent solution to the riddle of his existence because his existence has since come to look still more arbitrary, more a loitering (*eckensteherischer*), and more dispensable in the *visible* order of things? Has not man’s self-diminishment, his *will* to self-diminishment, been unstoppably progressing since Copernicus?

Nietzsche then alludes to the gradual reduction of human self-understanding to the “natural” condition of scientific findings, such as the “animal” characteristics given in biology (perhaps Nietzsche has Darwinism in mind here). He goes on:

Since Copernicus, man seems to have been on a downward path,—now he seems to be rolling faster and faster away from the center—whereto? Into nothingness? Into the “*piercing* sensation of his nothingness”?

We should notice here a clear reference to the language of the madman passage in *Gay Science* 125 that announced the death of God—the loss of a divine center that has the earth unchained from its sun, “straying as through an infinite nothingness.” Yet as I have suggested, the passage in question here pushes the matter further than just

the loss of historical warrants in modern thought, which could be called a concealed nihilism; here Nietzsche seems to declare that modern science is a manifestation of ascetic nihilism made more *actual* in a worldly sense. This is why he can say of the growing diminishment of human meaning in modern science: “Well! That would be the straight path—to the *old* ideal” (*GM* III, 25).

Here is my take on Nietzsche’s position: The original ascetic ideal found natural life meaningless and reached for transcendent relief. Modern science overcame religious transcendence, but with its *reductive* naturalism human meanings were robbed of their previous status and became superfluous in the natural order—despite (or because of) their being rendered “subjective” in modern thought. In this way science provides a *stronger* case for the meaninglessness of natural existence (compared with religious fantasy), and so within the sphere of natural life alone, *both* religion and science posit a lack of meaning. Moreover, since science restricts thought to the natural world, meaninglessness is now complete and exhaustive, because at least the old ideal provided the *solace* of an imagined deliverance. Nietzsche’s argument seems to be that a reductive *scientific* naturalism is no less nihilistic than supernaturalism; it is even more dangerous because it can *consummate* nihilism if science is accepted as the only proper account of nature. What we are circling around here is the important matter of how Nietzsche’s naturalism differs from scientific naturalism, and how Nietzsche’s approach would be looking for a natural *affirmation* of life-meanings. That is why Nietzsche says that a strictly scientific picture of the world “would be an essentially *meaningless* world” (*GS* 373), and that the question of the *value* of existence lacks “any grain of significance when measured scientifically” (*GS* P, 1).

In sum we can say that Nietzsche’s critique of the ascetic ideal targets every dimension of European thought—theological, philosophical, and scientific—owing to a common failure or inability to find natural life meaningful on its own terms. In the final sections of the Third Essay, Nietzsche explores the possibility of overcoming the ascetic ideal and its nihilistic implications. If there is any way to do this (and Nietzsche seems tentative) it will have to follow from an *affirmative* posture toward worldly existence, one which can dwell with all the differentiated and conflicting elements of natural life.

Notes

¹ Portions of this essay are taken from my recent book, *Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality: An Introduction* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

² Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, 4; Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, p. 470 (Akademie pagination).

³ Preface to *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1960), p. xvii.

⁴ *Descartes: Philosophical Letters*, trans. Anthony Kenny (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 94.

⁵ It can be argued that the *Meditations* is not primarily about the separability of mind and body, but simply the radical distinctness of thought and extension. See Marleen Rozemond, "Descartes' Case for Dualism," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 33/1 (January 1995), pp. 29-63. Thought and extension are principal attributes of mental and physical substance, which is the base of their modes. Individual bodies are modes of the principal attribute of extension. A substance has only one principal attribute, defining its essence and bearing its modes. So *res extensa* should not be called "body" but the core defining element of individual bodies. In other words, body can be *nothing other than* extension. This scheme allows the treatment of *all* bodies as subject to the singular analysis of mathematical relations, thus supplanting the Aristotelian view of qualitative differences among bodies, and justifying the reductive mechanism of the new physics of nature.

ABBREVIATIONS OF NIETZSCHE'S WORKS

- Cited numbers refer to text sections, except in the case of *KSA*.
- BGE* *Beyond Good and Evil*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, 1966).
- BT* *The Birth of Tragedy*, in *Basic Writings*.
- EH* *Ecce Homo*, in *Basic Writings*. The four main chapters will be indicated by roman numerals, with book titles in Chapter III abbreviated accordingly.
- GS* *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974).
- GM* *On the Genealogy of Morals*, in *Basic Writings*.
- HAH* *Human, All Too Human*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
- KSA* *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967).
- TI* *Twilight of the Idols*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954).
- WP* *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967).
- WS* *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, Part II of *Human, All Too Human*.
- Z* *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*. The four parts will be indicated by roman numerals, the sections by arabic numerals according to Kaufmann's listing on pages 112-114.