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The Optics of Science, Art and Life

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The greatest poverty is not to live
In a physical world, to feel that one's despair
Is too difficult to tell from desire.

Wallace Stevens, *Esthétique du Mal*, xv

Steven's poem reminds us that humans often and for manifold reasons resist living in a physical world. It is also the case that it is au courant these days in Nietzsche-criticism to label him a "naturalist."¹ On the face of it this seems a bit off. Whatever is meant by "naturalism" – be it *epistemological* in the sense that hypotheses must be explained and tested only by reference to natural causes and events, or metaphysical, in the sense of a worldview in which reality is such that there is nothing that counts but natural things, forces, and causes of the kind that the natural sciences study – neither of these understandings fit very well with Nietzsche.

In the capsule history of the West entitled "How the 'True World' finally became a Fable: the History of an Error." Nietzsche famously closes with: "The true world we abolished: which world was left? The apparent one perhaps? ... but no! *along with the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.*" Generally speaking, the idea of a naturalism in either of these guises rests on a binary opposition between a "real" world and an "ideal" or not-real one and the rejection of the second in favor of the first. But just as Platonism – which we might read as that which naturalism attacks – remains Platonism when stood on its head, so "naturalism" depends on the pre-existing opposition. When both are abolished, however, what is left is not "naturalism", nor is it idealism. "I find myself more in agreement with artists than with any philosophers hitherto," writes Nietzsche. He continues: "For myself and all those who live – are allowed to live – without the anxieties of a Puritan's conscience, I wish an ever greater spiritualization and multiplication of the senses."² Note: spiritualization *and* multiplication. Nietzsche *ungedrehter Platonismus* is not to be understood as the valuation of the natural as opposed to that of the supersensuous. Nietzsche gets rid of *both* terms. Thus if he is to be a naturalist, whatever he means by "nature" is far different from what is usually meant by that term be it

by Dennett, Dewey, Hook, Armstrong, Churchlands or Quine, ... or Leiter or Clark.

I should start out by saying that I have been increasingly convinced over the period of my life that I have been engaged by Nietzsche that his first book is not only among the most important, if not *the* most important, of his work, but sets out the project or projects that are to occupy him for the rest of his life in sanity. This project is political in the most extended sense of the world – it is, one might say, to explore, critique, and to change the unconscious of the West, such that a new second nature replace and become a first nature, as lays out the project explicitly at the end of the third section of the *Use and Misuse of History for Life*. In this sense, the problem is not ignorance – it is not that we lack information; it is rather how we know what we know. And for this we have no concepts: hence the critical task is much more radical, and much more complex even than Kant's. As Nietzsche remarks in criticism of Socrates: "That of which one cannot be conscious (*Unbewusste*) is greater than the ignorance (*Nichtwissen*) of Socrates."³

This said, the phrase that serves as my title comes from the second section of the 1886 "An Essay at Self-Critique" that Nietzsche added to a reissuing of *The Birth of Tragedy*. And with few exceptions – one of them is Professor Babich's work, especially the last chapter of her *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science* (to which I owe a special debt in this paper) ; another are some essays by Jacques Taminiaux and Gary Shapiro; a third – a prompt for all of them – is the section in on "The New Interpretation of Sensuousness" at the end of the "Will to Power as Art" section of Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche – with the exception of these and a few others, very little attention has been paid to *all* of the elements of this triple optic.⁴

When he returns in 1886 to his early work in a series of prefaces, he calls attention to what one might call the methodology of the *Birth*. It is to see *science* through the "optic of the *artist*, but also to see art through optic of *life*."⁵ Note especially the "but also". This is not a matter of taking up now this lens, now that, now a third. Rather as Nietzsche often tells us it is to have many perspectives, to have all these at once. The term "Optik" is singular: lens, optic, point of view – and it warns us that this is to be a matter of perspectivalism.

So, what is 'science'? The first realization here is that we are to understand the subject matter of *The Birth of Tragedy* as science. Science is here understood in the sense of *Wissenschaft*, here especially the philological science in which Nietzsche was trained. The very beginning of *The Birth of Tragedy* makes this explicit: "We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics, when we have arrived *not only* at the logical insight but also at the unmediated certainty of our experience (*Anschauung*) that the continuous production of art is tied up with the doubleness of the apollonian and the dionysian."⁶ Again the "not only,... but also" announce a common project. The project of the *Birth* is recover as part of our understanding the immediacy of experience – experience which Nietzsche thinks that the West has over time lost or rather denied itself. One of the consequences of Socratism and Christianity is that humans no longer live – they merely exist. They lack what Thoreau was to explore as and call a "natural life."⁷ Thus the critique of Socrates will be that he cannot allow himself – or is perhaps unable – to experience the world, here the tragedy. The accusation against Socrates is that

he cannot be an authentic audience member: this is to say that he cannot be open to the world. When Stevens claims, as in my epigraph, that “the greatest poverty/ is not to live in the physical world,” he is talking about the impoverishment of cutting oneself off from the experiencing of the world.

Here, however, we dispose immediately of the canard that Nietzsche was “opposed” to science –whatever that might mean. As Babich has written: “there is a sense in which Nietzsche approves science. This approval is not for the sake of its truths or facts, but rather for the sake of its ‘honesty.’ The conception of honesty here reflects the character of the knower as an inquirer in the field of reality who still has integrity. For Nietzsche this integrity constitutes the most redeeming legacy of the scientific turn.”⁸ This insistence on integrity as central to the practice and vocation of science will become the touchstone of Weber’s 1917 lecture *Wissenschaft als Beruf*. As Emerson had remarked in “Experience,” an essay Nietzsche knew well: “I would gladly be moral but I have my heart set on honesty.”

This is a science that is also passionate (again Weber will pick this up). Nietzsche has this to say about Aristotle: “According to Aristotle science has nothing to do with enthusiasm, for one cannot rely on this unusual force: the work of art is the realization of the artistic insight of a proper artistic nature. A petit bourgeois spirit!”⁹ However the science of which Nietzsche speaks (honest and passionate) is not science as it is practiced. Nietzsche entitles a section in the fourth book of *The Joyful Science* “*Hoch die Physik*” – Hooray for physics.¹⁰ He then goes on to say that practically *no one* knows how to observe anything and that when they do they apply a straitjacket of rules that makes the elements observed seem the same. (note the parallel to the accusation against Socrates). Against this, he urges that “we ... limit ourselves to the purification of our own opinions and valuations.” To become a being who “gives itself law” we must become “the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicists in order to be able to be creators in this sense – while hitherto all valuations and ideas have been based on ignorance of physics or were constructed so as to contradict it. Therefore: hooray for physics! And even more for that which compels us to turn to it – our honesty.”¹¹

Honesty is what science can give us. Honesty means to be critical and self-critical of all assumptions. This leads us to realize, as he tells us in the same paragraph of the *Joyful Science*, that no two actions are ever the same; that each past and future act is unique; that any rule or law is a gross simplification of the actions for which it purports to be a law; that appearance of sameness is only sameness in appearance (*Schein*). Thus for science, “*Schein*, as I understand it, is the actual and unique reality of things –it is that only to which existing predicates apply and which in a certain sense could not be better defined but by all predicates, that is also by contradictory predicates.”¹² Appearance is not opposed to “reality”, internally structured by and as the will to power. For if reality – the concern of science – is appearance, or rather coming into appearance, it is, as Heidegger notes, a “perspectival letting-shine (*Scheinlassen*).”¹³ The taking of appearance as reality is thus always and necessarily perspectival, thus an error, or sometimes, as in what becomes *Will to Power* 853, a “lie,” that we have in “order to live.”¹⁴

The analysis of science leads us thus to the question of art. It is as *artists* that we know that the world is brought into appearance, that it shines; hence by art we are reminded of the need for criticality in science. Famously, he writes in 1888, that “we have art so that we do not perish from truth.” Indeed, the philosopher who opts for truth “deserves a beating.” Nietzsche goes on immediately to note that this was the subject of his first book; in his notes he reserves here a place for a previously composed section on “Art in the *Birth of Tragedy*.”¹⁵ Note that this is 1888.

What then is art? In the notes of 1869 preparatory for the *Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche writes:

What is art? Is it the ability to engender (*erzeugen*) a world of will without will? No. It is to engender as new the world of will, without that which is brought about willing in its turn. It is thus an engendering of that which is without will by the will and *instinctively*. If there is consciousness one calls this a craft (*Handwerk*). With this [the conscious craft] the relation to engendering appears plausible, however the fullness of the will reappears.¹⁶

An entry shortly above this one expands the idea of art (as opposed to “the arts”).

We are unfortunately accustomed to enjoy the arts in isolation: the insanity of art galleries and concert halls. The *absolute arts* are a sad modern bad habit.¹⁷ Everything comes apart. There are no organizations that collectively cultivate the arts as art, that is cultivate the spheres in which the arts go together.

Rather each art goes a segment of the way alone and on another segment of the way accompanies the other arts.¹⁸

Thus when Nietzsche speaks of art he is speaking of something like *mousike*. Greek *mousike* refers to a vastly wider range of human activities than does our “music.”¹⁹ The “little” Liddell and Scott refers to *mousikos* as a “man of letters, a scholar, an accomplished person.” From this it follows that whatever is meant by music in Greek, it must refer to not only a much wider range of activities than “music,” but also to an integration of those activities one with the other. We may take what Nietzsche means by “art” to have such a reference. It gives us some clue as to the spirit of music from which tragedy is born.

As Thrasybulos Georgiades notes, *mousike* denotes an ongoing activity and a “musical education” is only possible through “musical activity.”²⁰ *Mousike* thus carries no implication of a tension between music and the (non-artistic) world. Not only was the world of *mousike* was not apart from the world of life, it served to create and maintain that world. Warren Anderson remarks, “the Greek term designates ... oral training in poetry ... that had for so long been the means of transmitting the values and precepts of Greek culture.”²¹ Plato says in the *Laches* that “A true musician has in his own life ... a harmony of words and deeds arranged.”²²

Science gives us what we can call truth. Art tells us that truth is something we have made. *Life* -- not all that is alive is life: Rousseau said that most of us die without having lived -- --is thus made of art and science but they are in permanent tension with each other.

These are important implications for the understanding of life. As Nietzsche remarks: “Art and nothing but art. It is the great enabler of life, the great seductress to life, the great stimulation to life.”²³ The above arguments are in no way claims that everything is “subjective” – simply our point of view. Nietzsche explicitly says that “even this is interpretation. The ‘subjective’ is not something given, it is something added, invented and projected behind what there is. ... Insofar as the word ‘knowledge’ has any meaning, the world is knowable...; it does not have meaning behind it; it has countless meanings.”²⁴ All that we need to know and all that we can know is present in the world as we encounter it – this is the meaning of the “Midnight” poem in *Zarathustra*.

Thus nothing is closer to “reality” than anything else, for there is nothing to be close to. He writes: “The ‘subject’ is a fiction that many similar states in us are the effects of one substratum; but it is we who first created the ‘similarity’ of these states; our adjusting them and making them similar is the fact, not their similarity – which had ought to be denied.” He compares the “subject” to a regent at the head of a commonality, never so sure of its position that it can simply ignore the world around it.²⁵ The ‘ego’ is an “apparent unity in which all is gathered as if bonded by an horizon.”²⁶

With this we can arrive a new understanding of Nietzsche’s advocacy of “having many points of view” – many optics. In 1884, Nietzsche had written the following as an “insight.”

All estimations of value are a matter of a definite perspective: the maintenance of an individual, a commonality, a race, a state, a church, a belief, a culture. Due to the forgetfulness that there are only perspectival evaluations, all sorts of contradictory evaluations and thus contradictory drives swarm *inside one person*. This is the expression of the diseased condition in man, in opposition to the condition in animals, where all instincts play particular roles. This contradictory creature has however in his nature a great method of knowing: he feels many for’s and against’s – he raises himself up to justice – to a comprehension beyond the valuation of good and evil. The wisest man would be the richest in contradictions, who as it were, has feelers for all kinds of men: and right among them his great moments of grandiose harmony. – the great accident in us also – a form of planetary emotion.²⁷

Justice is the ability to hold to contradictions. We are not to think of the subject as a unity but as a multiplicity, what he calls a *Vielheit*.²⁸

Stevens again:

And out of what one sees and hears and out
Of what one feels, who could have thought to make
So many selves, so many sensuous worlds,
As if the air, the mid-day air, was swarming
With the metaphysical changes that occur,
Merely in living as and where we live.

But we do not hold to this: we put value into things and this value has an effect on us after we have “forgotten that we were the donors.”²⁹ It is in those

who rise up to “justice,” however, that life remains multiple. In such life is an “experiment of the thinker ... not a duty, not a fatality, not a deceit.”³⁰

What does it mean to think of life as an experiment? It has some relation to what Jean Granier called “multiple ontologies”³¹ but it is also an “experiment, an endeavor, always subject to the temptation that one may call oneself finished, given and final.” (One thinks of Whitman, whom, we learn from Thomas Brobjer, Nietzsche had apparently read. One thinks of J.S. Mill, who, in *On liberty*, calls for “experiments in living.”).

It is worth noting in passing that this is *not* a theory of false consciousness. It is not that our place in the world keeps us from seeing what “really” is the case. The perspectival understanding places the emphasis not on “truth” and the lack thereof but on the consequences of perspectives for what counts as life. Our task is “to see things as they are. Means: we look at them from a hundred eyes, from many persons” and precisely *not* to see them “impersonally.”³²

Thus the fact that we are alive – and that we die – means that we will always be unable to do full justice to the world, which would require that one have so transparent a contact with it (in all its becoming) that there would be “no simplification of it.” We must thus accept as a predicate of human existence that it is “unjust.” In the 1886 preface to *Human, All-Too-Human* Nietzsche argues that one can never experience the world as other than unjust and that it is a sign of health that one forgo any attempt to conceive of experience in the world as other than tragic. Already in the 1879 lectures on *Oedipus Tyrannos* Nietzsche had made the point the tragedy present “the deepest conflict between life and thought.” Greek tragedy shows us what it would mean (as an audience member) to accept the fact that all knowledge is perspectival, including that which we have of ourselves.

If there is nothing besides perspective, then it must not be the case that the world cannot be known, *but that it is in the nature of the world as we experience it to be known*. The danger is that we take our experience of the knowledge we have and conclude that this and this alone is *the* truth. If what we mean by nature is what is known, and known in multiple ways, then there is no naturalism, for there is no given nature. The world embodies all that we need to understand it, providing only that we do not insist on understanding it according to a arrogant and solipsistic notion of a unitary self. *Knowledge is never immaculate but it need not be flawed* – a radicalization of a lesson we first learned from Kant.

The answer as to why humans insist on seeing the world as a unity is the subject of Nietzsche’s genealogical investigations. The question as to what condemns us to experience the world as known and thus ensures that we will experience the world as a self comes in the doctrine of the will to power. Here a few reminders. All life is/has will to power. The activity of the will to power, Nietzsche calls “interpretation,” “a means to become master of something.”³³ The will to power understands/interprets/makes in terms of the old; it extends the understanding and the categories of the life and action of a particular being over that which is not yet that being.

In the second section of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche notes that “there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspectival estimates and appearances.”³⁴ Two sections later he introduces the notion of a “text without an

author” and deepens his earlier statement by suggesting that to view the world as will to power is to view it from the “inside,” that is on its own terms. The perspectival world is thus a text without an author, and is “determined and characterized according to its ‘intelligible character’.”³⁵ A text without an author has nothing behind it. It is exactly what it is, and there is no realm or author to which one can appeal for corroboration or final verification.³⁶ Hence when we speak of the world as will to power we mean that the world as it presents itself to us in our claim to knowledge, is *completely* intelligible. In 1887, Nietzsche notes the following as a “basic question”:

If the perspectival belongs to being (Wesen) as such? And is not only as a form of considering, a relation among different beings (Wesen). Do the different powers stand in relation, such that this relation is tied to the observation-optic. This would be possible if all being (Sein) were essentially some kind of observation.³⁷

Perspectivalism is not therefore the perspective *of* something, for there can be no thing without perspective(s). Indeed, “there would be nothing called knowledge, if thought did not reform the world into ‘things’.”³⁸ I note parenthetically here that it follows that the unity (or unities) of Nietzsche’s texts is to be found *in his readers* and that there is no authorial unity imposed by him on the texts, any more than a subject might impose a unity on the world. Thus any strictures that Nietzsche applies to his understanding of the subject apply also to his teaching on perspectivalism and life. Perspectivalism cannot be a doctrine or a point of view because, properly understood, it makes impossible the epistemological activism that such a doctrine would require. Nietzsche thus anticipates the position in relation to texts that one finds in Barthes or Foucault (not surprisingly since they get it from him). And more importantly, despite appearances to the contrary, Nietzsche never never (well, hardly ever) speaks *ex cathedra*.

And this allows us to say something about the optic of life. In the “Morality as Anti-Nature” section of *Twilight*, Nietzsche has critiqued the Christian morality as a “revolt against life.” He immediately points out that a condemnation of life “by one who is alive is, in the end just a symptom of a particular kind of life”; the question of the *value* of life is from the “optic of life” inaccessible. “Life itself values through us when we set out (*ansetzen*) values.” So the question becomes *what kind of life* has these values: his answer is that it is “declining, weakened, tired and condemned life.” Certain value judgments are consequent to a certain kinds of life but these can have no absolute standing.³⁹ Indeed, in the last section of *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche will speak appreciatively of the tiger who has failed his leap and wants to go under: the tiger has accepted his “value judgments” for what they are.

What Nietzsche *cannot* accept is the moral judgment that moralizes itself, that takes its own value judgments to be absolute. Thus in the next section he says that “The morality, insofar as it condemns on its own grounds (*an sich*) and not with regard to, in consideration of, from the purposes of life, is a specific error for which one can have no sympathy, .. an error that has done an unspeakable amount of harm!”⁴⁰ This is what Stevens was to call “that evil in the self.” Life is an optic of which we are tempted to forget that it is one. And

this is why Nietzsche's naturalism, if one were to speak that way, is other: the question is what *kind* of life. For those professional philosophers who profess naturalism, there is no question of what *kinds* of nature.

Three things follow: First the writer and thinker is forced to the necessity of an unrelenting honesty towards him or herself and the reader. All pretense must be shown to be pretense and all is, at some level, pretense. Secondly, it is impossible for a thinker honestly to claim to have found the solution to problems. Each must find them for him or herself -- each group or country also -- or they will not count -- this is the democracy in Nietzsche and he writes in such a manner as to make this possible. Finally there is no privileged position from which to discuss the world as if one were not part of it. All views are views from somewhere and it is the view that gives us some thing. This does not make rationality impossible -- quite the contrary.

I started with Wallace Stevens and I end with him also, still on message:

How cold the vacancy
When the phantoms are gone and the shaken realist
First sees reality. The mortal no
Has its emptiness and tragic expirations.
The tragedy, however, may have begun,
[incipit tragoedia, wrote Nietzsche]
Again, in the imagination's new beginning,
In the yes of the realist spoken because he must
Say yes, spoken because under every no
Lay a passion for yes that had never been broken.

(section viii)

Notes

¹ See Brian Leiter, "Nietzsche's Naturalism Reconsidered," in *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche*, edited by J. Richardson and K. Gemes. Oxford University Press, forthcoming; Mathias Risse, "Nietzsche's 'Animal Psychology' versus Kantian Ethics," in Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu, eds. *Nietzsche and morality* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), pp 57-82. See the discussion in Lee Kerckhove, "Re-thinking ethical naturalism: Nietzsche's 'open question' argument," *Man and World* 27 (1994), pp.54-64.

² WKG VII-3, 313: In der Hauptsache gebe ich den Künstlern mehr Recht als allen Philosophen bisher: sie verloren die große Spur nicht, auf der das Leben geht, sie liebten die Dinge „dieser Welt“ — sie liebten ihre Sinne. Entsinnlichung zu erstreben: das scheint mir ein Mißverständnis oder eine Krankheit oder eine Kur, wo sie nicht eine bloße Heuchelei oder Selbstbetrügerei ist. Ich wünsche mir selber und allen denen, welche ohne die Ängste eines Puritaner-Gewissens leben — leben dürfen, eine immer größere Vergeistigung und Vervielfältigung der Sinne;...

³ WKG III-3 17

⁴ For instance see Mullen, D. C. (1994). "Art, Science, and Truth in Nietzsche and Heidegger." *International Studies in Philosophy*: 26(1) 45-55. — truth takes over from life.

⁵ BT essay 2 WKG III-1, X "Prism" as in the Cambridge UP trans. Introduces a notion of distortion.

⁶ BT 1 WKG III-1 21

⁷ Henry David Thoreau, *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*.

⁸ Babich, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science*, 131

⁹ WKG III-3 26: Nach Aristoteles hat die Wissenschaft nichts mit dem Enthusiasmus zu thun, da man sich auf diese ungewöhnliche Kraft nicht verlassen kann: das Kunstwerk ist Erzeugniß der Kunsteinsicht bei gehöriger Künstlernatur. Spießbürgerei!

¹⁰ GS 335 WKG V-2, 240-244

¹¹ Φύσις refers nature (and also to growth). In Walden ("Spring") Thoreau gives magnificently paced vision of a world coming into being.

¹² WKG VII-3, 386: Schein wie ich es verstehe, ist die wirkliche und einzige Realität der Dinge, — das, dem alle vorhandenen Prädikate erst zukommen und welches verhältnißmäßig am besten noch mit allen, also auch den entgegengesetzten Prädikaten zu bezeichnen ist.

¹³ Heidegger, *Nietzsche I*, 248 (Krell, I, 215)

¹⁴ WKG VIII-2, 435

¹⁵ For this section see WKG VII-3, 17ff (with directions as to where to insert it).

¹⁶ WKG III-3 19: Was ist Kunst? Die Fähigkeit die Welt des Willens zu erzeugen ohne Willen? Nein. Die Welt des Willens wieder zu erzeugen, ohne daß das Produkt wieder will. Also es gilt Erzeugung des Willenlosen durch Willen und instinktiv. Mit Bewußtsein nennt man dies Handwerk. Dagegen leuchtet die Verwandtschaft mit der Zeugung ein, nur daß hier das Willensvolle wieder entsteht.

¹⁷ "Absolute" here refers to a concept of an art as having relation to nothing other than itself. It is exemplified by a claim like this from Hanslick: "Music has no subject beyond the combinations of

notes we hear, for music speaks not only by means of sounds, it speaks nothing but sound." .

See Daniel Chua, *Absolute music and the Construction of meaning* (CUP, 1999) and Carl Dahlhaus, *The Idea of Absolute Music*.

¹⁸ WKG III-3 18: Wir sind leider gewöhnt, die Künste in der Vereinzelung zu genießen: Wahnsinn der Gemäldegalerie und des Konzertsaaes. Die *absoluten Künste* sind eine traurige moderne Unart. Es fällt alles auseinander. Es giebt keine Organisationen, die die Künste als Kunst zusammenpflegen, d.h. also die Gebiete, wo die Künste zusammengehen.

Jede Kunst hat ein Stück des Wegs allein und ein andres wo sie mit den andern Künsten zusammengeht.

¹⁹ This and the next paragraph draws directly from Babette Babich, "Mousik Techne: The Philosophical Practice of Music from Socrates to Nietzsche to Heidegger," in Massimo Verdicchio and Robert Burch, eds., *Gesture and Word: Thinking Between Philosophy and Poetry*. Evanston. Northwestern University Press, 2002. See also her *Words in Blood, Like Flowers* (SUNY Presss, 2004) and my "The Tragic Ethic and the Spirit of Music," *International Studies in Philosophy*.

²⁰ Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Musik und Rhythmus bei den Griechen. Zum Ursprung der abendländischen Musik* (Hamburg. Rowohlt, 1958) 52-53 (cited from Babich)

²¹ Warren D. Anderson, *Music and Musicians in Ancient Greece* (Cornell UP, 1994) p.143

²² Laches 188D

²³ VIII-2, 435; VIII-3, 318

²⁴ WKG VIII-1, 323

²⁵ This is remarkably like the picture that Hume gives in the chapter "Of Personal Identity" in the *Treatise*.

²⁶ WKG VIII-1, 104; WKG VII-3, 165-166.

²⁷ WKG VII-2, 179-180. Einsicht: bei aller Werthschätzung handelt es sich um eine bestimmte Perspektive: Erhaltung des Individuums, einer Gemeinde, einer Rasse, eines Staates, einer Kirche, eines Glaubens, einer Cultur — vermöge des Vergessens, daß es nur ein perspektivisches Schätzen giebt, wimmelt alles von widersprechenden Schätzungen und folglich von widersprechenden Antrieben in Einem Menschen. Dies ist der Ausdruck der Erkrankung am Menschen, im Gegensatz zum Thiere, wo alle vorhandenen Instinkte ganz bestimmten Aufgaben genügen. — dies widerspruchsvolle Geschöpf hat aber an seinem Wesen eine große Methode der Erkenntniß: er fühlt viele Für und Wider — er erhebt sich zur Gerechtigkeit — zum Begreifen jenseits des Gut- und Böseschätzens. Der weiseste Mensch wäre der reichste an Widersprüchen, der gleichsam Tastorgane für alle Arten Mensch hat: und zwischeninnen seine großen Augenblicke grandiosen Zusammenklangs — der hohe Zufall auch in uns! — eine Art planetarischer Bewegung. See Heidegger *Nietzsche I* 632ff.

²⁸ WKG VII-3, 382

²⁹ WKG VII-1, 196

³⁰ WKG V-2, 232

³¹ See his *Le problème de la vérité*, 357-366

³² WKG V-2, 364

³³ WKG VIII-1, 159

³⁴ JGB 34 WKG VI-2, 39

³⁵ JGB 36 WKG VI-2, 51

³⁶ I have argued this in relation to Hobbes' *Leviathan*. See my "How to Write Scripture" in *Critical Inquiry*, 1995

³⁷ WKG VIII-1, 192: Grundfrage: ob das Perspektivische zum Wesen gehört? Und nicht nur eine Betrachtungs-form, eine Relation zwischen verschiedenen Wesen ist? Stehen die verschiedenen Kräfte in Relation, so daß diese Relation gebunden ist an Wahrnehmungs-Optik? Diese wäre möglich, wenn alles Sein essentiell etwas Wahrnehmendes wäre.

³⁸ WKG VII-1, 353

³⁹ GD Moral 5 WKG VI-3, 80

⁴⁰ GD Moral 6 WKG VI-3, 81
