



# nietzsche

Conferencia Internacional / International Conference

el devenir de la vida the becoming of life

## Actas / Proceedings

**Heeding the Law of Life: Receptivity,  
Submission, Hospitality**

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In this essay, I attempt to make some limited sense of the conclusion of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morality* (henceforth, *GM*), which was written and published in 1887. In doing so, I will focus my attention not on the final Section of the book, whose contributions are by no means trivial or incidental, but on the penultimate Section of the book, which is Section 27 of the Third Essay. I will further restrict my focus to the concluding sentences of this unusually dense Section.

My reason for restricting so severely the focus of my investigation is that I am interested in charting the various *endings* that Nietzsche is obliged to provide as he approaches the conclusion of the book. The irony here is that for all of his concern to manage the endgame of late modernity, he is notoriously reluctant to bring anything to a final, definitive conclusion. Adept at opening new vistas, fresh lines of inquiry, and novel angles of vision, he is surprisingly inept at bringing his various experiments and investigations to a satisfying conclusion. To the writings from the post-Zarathustran period of his career, he appends all manner of postscripts, epilogues, songs, poems, and so on. Perhaps the most egregious example of this tendency is *The Case of Wagner*, which he finally concludes after adding a conclusion that expresses his three summary "demands" [*Forderungen*] (*CW* 12), a Postscript, a Second Postscript, and an Epilogue.

Nietzsche is most obviously obliged to bring to an end the Third Essay of *GM* and thereby complete his explanation of the *meaning* of ascetic ideals. Equally obviously, he must bring to an end the book itself, this convoluted "polemic" [*Streitschrift*] that has taken aim at so many targets but produced no definitive victims. Less obviously, Nietzsche must bring to an end the program of education and training that furnishes the book with its peculiar rhetorical-dramatic structure. It is not often noticed that *GM* is presented as a didactic training exercise, wherein Nietzsche sustains a largely one-sided conversation with his preferred readers, instructing and guiding them as he advances the book's wandering narrative. Will he now expose this program of education and training as a rhetorical prop, perhaps even as a writerly indulgence, or has this program induced genuine, discernible change in those readers whom he has escorted, supposedly, from innocence to experience?

Even less obviously, Nietzsche somehow must bring to an end the complex rhetorical exercise that comprises Sections 23-27 of Essay III, wherein he

communicates only indirectly with his best readers as they grapple with his startling exposé of the ascetic ideal. Reluctant to identify them directly and unambiguously as the last knights of the Christian-ascetic ideal—and not, as they wishfully suppose, as the long-awaited conquerors of the ascetic ideal—he deploys various rhetorical devices in the service of his hope that they will come to this painful realization on their own.

Here, it seems to me, we are entitled to ask after the *payoff* of the wide-ranging investigation conducted in *GM*. What is the moral of the story of morality? What have we learned, or perhaps become, as a result of faithfully following Nietzsche's tangled narrative thread? In what ways are we now better prepared to face the uncertain future he has sketched for us?

There are several plausible responses to this general line of questioning, but I will limit myself here to a single one. Nietzsche advertises his objective in Essay III, or so I submit, by affixing to its head an epigraph drawn from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. His objective, it would appear, is to assist his readers in becoming *unconcerned*, *mocking*, and *violent*, precisely so that they might attract the favor of wisdom, who, we are reminded, "is a woman and always loves only a warrior" (*GM* III:E). Toward this end, he trains his readers to become "antagonists" [*Gegner*] of the ascetic ideal while preparing them to encounter—and even to defend!—the bellicose ascetic priest (*GM* III:11). As we shall see, however, their struggles against the ascetic ideal and the ascetic priest are not the ends for which Nietzsche trains them, but only the means toward a greater, valedictory end. Having taken Zarathustra's advice and become warriors, they now must prepare themselves to undergo a final transformation. As we learn in the penultimate Section of *GM*, perhaps to our great surprise, Nietzsche's best readers must become the warrior-servants who will host the demise of Christian morality. Having gained wisdom, they now may heed the call to submit to the legislations they have imposed on others. Doing so will position them in turn to *affirm* the impending demise of Christian morality, such that they might proclaim, "*Thus we willed it!*"

The payoff, in short, is this: The acquisition of wisdom, *per* Zarathustra's imported exhortation, frees Nietzsche's readers to cultivate and display those virtues that may yet enable humankind to survive the death of God. As we shall see, these are the virtues of *receptivity*, *submission*, and *hospitality*. Not exactly the stuff of heroes and legends, I grant, but the time for heroic labors and legendary exploits has long since passed. These are not the virtues that we typically associate with Nietzsche or with the Nietzschean type, but they are the virtues that he praises and promotes for the transitional epoch in which we find ourselves. Wisdom may want us to be warriors, which is why Nietzsche enlists Zarathustra to address his readers, but life wants us to heed its call, which is why Nietzsche encourages them to become receptive, submissive, and hospitable.

## Section I

Toward the end of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, in an apparent attempt to tease something resembling a conclusion from his rambling exposé of the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche suddenly (and ominously) invokes the *law of life* [*das Gesetz das Lebens*]:

All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-cancellation [*Selbstaufhebung*]<sup>1</sup>: thus the law of life will have it, the law of the *necessity* of “self-overcoming” [„*Selbstüberwindung*“] in the nature of life—the lawgiver [*Gesetzgeber*] himself eventually receives the call: “*patere legem, quam ipse tulisti.*” (*GM* III:27)<sup>2</sup>

Hoping to impress upon his best readers that he and they occupy a node of world-historical transformation, Nietzsche thus presents them with the tantalizing possibility that their seemingly unremarkable labors of *self-overcoming*—most notably, as we shall see, their experimental, self-directed challenge to the will to truth—may converge with, and actually expedite, the *self-cancellation* of Christian morality. Owing to the unprecedented opportunities afforded them by their unique historical situation, he and they are poised to host the final stage in the demise of Christian morality and the decline of the ascetic ideal.

Before I proceed, four points are worth noting about the extracted passage above:

1. Nietzsche’s use of the term *Selbstaufhebung*, which is by no means a staple of his philosophical vocabulary, would have put his German readers immediately in mind of Hegel, leading them to anticipate a Hegelian (viz., dialectical) solution to the historical problem posed by the ascetic ideal.<sup>3</sup> Although I believe that Nietzsche knows what he is doing here, he clearly is playing with fire and risking widespread misinterpretation of his aims.
2. The collapse of Christian morality is presented here as a *fait accompli*, which means that there is nothing that Nietzsche’s readers need do to bring these events to pass. As we shall see, however, Nietzsche hopes nonetheless that his target audience will endeavor to align its will with the law of life.
3. The source of the *call* [*Ruf*] is not identified. If Nietzsche’s historical account is accurate, however, we know this to be the call of *conscience*. As we shall see, in fact, the highest and ultimate expression of the conscience is the call to subvert Christian morality itself.
4. This call is delivered in Latin, which is the language of empire. Of course, Latin is also a priestly language, as he makes clear with his citations from the toxic writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and Tertullian—which, we might note, he does not deign to translate into German (*GM* I:15). Presumably, those who receive and heed this call will restore Latin to its former position of imperial privilege.

This is Nietzsche’s first reference in *GM* to the “law of life,”<sup>4</sup> and it comes at a crucial (and noticeably *late*) juncture in the elaboration of his main narrative. Surely he might have mentioned this law earlier in *GM*, especially if he meant all along to spring it on us in the eleventh hour. Even if we are willing to excuse his self-serving penchant for suspense, we nevertheless may wonder if this law of life is anything more than a *lex ex machina*, clumsily devised to allow a beleaguered author to take leave of a hopelessly unruly narrative.

More charitably, we might interpret Nietzsche’s reference to the law of life as conveying his presumption that his readers are (or will become) familiar with this “law” from his earlier writings, in particular his *Zarathustra* (*GM* P8). We know from his

*Zarathustra*, for example, that life is “*that which must always overcome itself [was sich immer selber überwinden muss]*” (Z II:12). Of course, we also know from his *Zarathustra* that the title character is not entirely sincere in professing his love of Life (Z III:15.2), in large part because he is not willing to submit to the iron law of self-overcoming that he so eagerly prescribes to others. We know this, moreover, from no less an authority than Life herself, who reveals that Zarathustra is unable to affirm the becoming of life. When he does not receive from Life the special consideration he seeks for himself, such that he might be granted an exemption from the law of self-overcoming, he promptly leaves her for another woman, whom he calls *Eternity* (Z III:16).

Having squandered the opportunity to align his will with the law of life, Zarathustra is obliged to submit to this law as if to an objectionable, alien decree. This is why, presumably, he must seek the metaphysical comfort embodied by his presumptive bride, Eternity, in whose embrace he will forever be spared the self-overcoming he legislates to all other beings. On this (admittedly heterodox) interpretation, Zarathustra is representative of those legislators who receive, but fail to heed, the call to submit to the laws they have prescribed to others.<sup>5</sup> These legislators will submit to the law of life in any event—hence Nietzsche’s reference above to the “*necessity*” of self-overcoming—but they are powerless to experience their submission as an expression of their own willing. “Thus I willed it” is precisely what they *cannot* say about their own inevitable submission to the law of life.

Nietzsche does not identify the lawgivers who are called (in Latin) to submit to their own legislations. From *Beyond Good and Evil*, however, we know that he regards “*Genuine philosophers...[as] commanders and lawgivers [Befehlende und Gesetzgeber]*,” in large part because they decree, “*thus it shall be!*”... (BGE 211). From *The Gay Science*, moreover, we know that Nietzsche places himself and his fellow “*good Europeans*” in the lineage of those German *philosophers*—he names Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer—whose legislations have propagated “*Europe’s longest and bravest self-overcoming*”(GS 357). We may thus assume with some confidence that the lawgivers in question include Nietzsche and his best readers, those “*unconditional honest atheists*” whom the passage imported from GS 357 identifies as “*good Europeans*” (GM III:27).<sup>6</sup>

Having boldly ruled against the lie that sustained belief in the Christian God—which, they mistakenly believe, qualifies them as “*unconditional honest atheists*”—Nietzsche and his best readers are now called to rule against the kindred lie that sustains *their own* belief in the divinity of truth. In doing so, he implies, they will submit voluntarily to the law they have prescribed to others. As the imported passage confirms, moreover, they are uniquely qualified to do so, by virtue of the “*rigor*” [*Streng*] with which their “*conscience*” asserts itself. Having called to order the entirety of European civilization, they now must call themselves to order. The time has come for them to assay, scientifically and experimentally, the *genuine* value of truth.<sup>7</sup>

He continues: Christian truthfulness, which is all that remains viable in Christian morality, will draw its “*most striking inference*,”—i.e., “*its inference against itself*”—“*when it poses the question ‘what is the meaning of all will to truth?’*” (GM III:27). Although Nietzsche does not name the agent(s) who will pose this question on behalf of Christian truthfulness, the question itself recalls the “*task*” he earlier defined for himself and his best readers. At the conclusion of Section 24, we recall, Nietzsche declared,

From the moment faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, a *new problem arises*: that of the *value* of truth. The will to truth requires a critique—let us thus define our own task [*Aufgabe*]—the value of truth must for once be experimentally [*versuchsweise*]<sup>8</sup> called into question. (GM III:24)

Let us note the similarity between the question that now needs asking—“What is the meaning of all will to truth?” [*was bedeutet aller Wille zur Wahrheit?*]—and the question that serves as the title of Essay III: “What is the meaning of ascetic ideals?” [*was bedeuten asketische Ideale?*] This similarity, I propose, is no coincidence. First of all, both questions are now possible for the first time; never before has either question been asked or answered. Second, Nietzsche’s question here presents a more current and precise formulation of the question embedded in the title of Essay III. Presumably, those who join Nietzsche in posing such a question will fully appreciate that the will to truth simply *is* the most current incarnation of the ascetic ideal. Asking after the meaning of the will to truth is the best way available to us of asking after the meaning of ascetic ideals.

Nietzsche thus means for his best readers to interrogate the meaning of the will to truth precisely as he has interrogated the meaning of the ascetic ideal. If he has trained them well, moreover, they will arrive at a similar conclusion: The preponderance of the will to truth *means* that Western science has proceeded only as a veiled expression of the will to nothingness. Rather than recoil from this will to nothingness, moreover, Nietzsche’s readers are urged to harness its destructive power in the service of *their* task. By asking after the truth about truth, they may succeed in turning the will to nothingness *against itself*.

Returning now to the main narrative, we are in a position to understand that Nietzsche and his best readers will represent Christian truthfulness in its finest hour, as it issues a mortal challenge to Christian morality.<sup>9</sup> By steering the will to truth into an unprecedented confrontation with itself, they will expose its reliance on an unacknowledged *faith* in truth, about which scholars and scientists heretofore have been anything but truthful. As it turns out, moreover, their challenge to the will to truth ultimately must be *self-directed* and self-referential in nature,<sup>10</sup> for the will to truth now resides only *in them*. No one else still believes in the saving power of truth, and no one else is historically positioned to tell the truth about truth. Nietzsche’s insight here is that he and his best readers stand in a dual relationship to the will to truth. Like all idealists, they cannot help but seek and tell the truth. Unlike all other idealists hitherto, however, they may aspire to tell the truth about truth itself.

There is another, more uniquely Nietzschean sense in which this critique of truth must proceed *experimentally*. If Nietzsche and his fellow “knowers” are among the last believers in the divinity of truth, they will have little choice but to direct their critique of truth against *themselves*. (Even if they begin this critique by directing it toward others, as Nietzsche pretends to do in this Section, they eventually must call into question their own unscientific estimations of the value of truth.) An “experimental” critique of truth would thus require them to engage in *self-directed* criticism, the practice of which Nietzsche increasingly comes to recommend in his post-Zarathustran writings as a sign

of renewed strength and renascent health. As we shall see, in fact, the requirement of self-directed criticism is central to his anticipated contribution to the destruction of Christian morality. The will to truth will finally become “conscious of itself as a *problem*,” that is, in and through the experiments that Nietzsche and his “*unknown* friends” will perform on themselves (*GM* III:27).

This particular claim merits further attention, for it sheds clarifying light on the kind of readership, or “we,” that Nietzsche has endeavored to build throughout the book. Here he explicitly links their newly determined task to their desire (and corresponding quest) for *meaning* [*Sinn*],<sup>11</sup> which they will secure, or so he supposes, only in the event that *in them* “the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a *problem*” (*GM* III:27). That Nietzsche appeals to the *meaning* to be found in a collective challenge to the will to truth is indicative of his refusal thus far of “modern science” and its nihilistic campaign to deprive existence—and especially *human* existence—of the meaning formerly accorded it (*GM* III:25).<sup>12</sup> Here it becomes clear, in fact, that Nietzsche understands the task reserved for him and his “*unknown* friends” as consistent with an approach to science that rejects “the absolute fortuitousness, even the mechanistic senselessness of all events” (*GM* II:12) just as vigorously as it refuses supernatural principles of explanation.<sup>13</sup> In facing the will to truth with its problematic faith in truth, that is, Nietzsche and his “we” must become practitioners of what he calls the *gay science*, by virtue of which they will “cheerfully” resist the nihilistic conclusions that their critique of science would seem (to others) to countenance (*GM* P7).

By implicating himself in a collective quest for collective meaning, moreover, Nietzsche finally acknowledges the full extent of his dependence on his best readers. While addressing his “*unknown* friends,” he explicitly identifies *his* problem—viz., the problem of securing adequate meaning [*Sinn*]*—as “our problem”* (*GM* III:27). Without their assistance, he thus concedes, he cannot carry out the assault he has planned on the stubborn remains of Christian morality. Nor can he find adequate motivation for doing so in the individual meaning that he might derive from his solitary efforts. Inasmuch as the meaning he seeks must be shared with this “we,” he acknowledges that he must fully immerse himself—with none of his familiar caveats, conditions, or reservations—in its “whole being” (*GM* III:27).<sup>14</sup> In typically Nietzschean fashion, of course, he also withholds himself from his best readers, claiming that “as yet I *know* of no friend” (*GM* III:27).

Here, I suspect, he is not simply being playful or gnomic. Despite his preference for an increasingly nomadic form of existence, Nietzsche knew several individuals whom he readily acknowledged as current or former friends. What none of these flesh-and-blood friends provided, however, was the genuine sense of meaningful belongingness and collective destiny that his new “task” obliges him to seek. As he explains in *Ecce Homo*, the completion of his *Zarathustra* led him to look around for “those *related* to [him]” [*Verwandten*] (*EH*: bge 1, emphasis added), which suggests a degree of intimacy and mutual understanding that his anemic contemporaries would have been unlikely to muster and unable to sustain. The “*unknown* friends” whom he seeks in *GM* are such as will enable him, finally, to immerse himself in the collective agency and identity of a genuine and worthy “we.” Indeed, although he does not say so explicitly, we may assume with some confidence that the virtues sponsored by wisdom are meant to be understood as virtues of reciprocal dependency, i.e., belonging or

pertaining to the emerging collectivity. Only as a “we,” that is, will Nietzsche and his unknown friends translate their wisdom into the virtues of submission, receptivity, and hospitality.

What wisdom wants, as we have seen, is for Nietzsche’s readers to become *warriors*, which means that they must present themselves as *unconcerned*, *mocking*, and *violent*. What Nietzsche wants, as we are now in a position to appreciate, is for his best readers, having become wise, to join him in hosting the final stage in the self-overcoming of Christian morality. Toward this higher end, Nietzsche urges his best readers—albeit via an extremely indirect mode of communication—to attune themselves to the wishes of life itself. It is here that Nietzsche’s best readers may succeed where his “son,” Zarathustra, failed. As we recall, Zarathustra refused to conform to the wishes of Life, seeking for himself an exemption from the iron law of self-overcoming. Despite preaching to others the necessity of this law, Zarathustra secretly hoped that his love for Life would earn him this special favor. When Life denied his petition, he promptly sought refuge in the suspiciously metaphysical embrace of Eternity.

Zarathustra’s cowardice helpfully illuminates what is involved in the *wisdom* that Nietzsche has trained his aspiring “warriors” to attract (*GM* III: E).<sup>15</sup> As I suggested earlier, the possession of wisdom, though estimable in its own right, is not the final end toward which Nietzsche guides his readers in *GM*; having become wise, they now must put their wisdom to the test and behave accordingly. If his readers are wise, they will both receive *and* heed the call to submit to the laws they have prescribed to others. In particular, as we have seen, they will submit voluntarily to the demands for probity and truth that they have levied against others. Although they will submit to this law in any event, their receptivity to this call affords them the opportunity to do so as an expression of their own will. The proof of their wisdom thus lies in their capacity to affirm the necessity of their own self-overcoming and, subsequently, to align their collective will with the “law of life.” Having done so, they may experience their inevitable submission not as a cruel, absurd injustice, much less as an objection to life itself, but as a fully natural consequence of their lawgiving, of which they might proclaim, “Thus we willed it.”

In order to succeed where Zarathustra failed, thereby proving the sincerity of their love of life, Nietzsche’s readers now must conform to the wishes of life itself, just as earlier they conformed to the wishes of wisdom. What life wants, we are now in a position to understand, is for Nietzsche’s readers to become a brotherhood of *warrior-servants*. Having already grown wise, they now must cultivate and manifest the virtues of *receptivity*, *submission*, and *hospitality*. In particular, they must *receive* the call to submit, *submit* to the laws they have imposed on others, and *host* the self-orchestrated demise of Christian morality. They must do so, moreover, as an expression of their own will—which they have aligned, voluntarily, with the law of life—such that they may say of the impending crisis and collapse, “Thus we willed it!” As we have seen, in fact, these virtues must be acquired and exercised by a genuine collective or “we,” wherein individual readers find their meaning, destiny, and identity.

Nietzsche closes this Section of *GM* on a note that is equally suggestive of hope and despair. The centuries to come, he promises, will spawn cataclysms and convulsions that may excite our desire for self-annihilation and consign the human species to extinction.<sup>16</sup> Alternately, these very same disruptions may contribute to the

self-overcoming of morality, the installation of a post-ascetic ideal, and the dawning of an extra-moral epoch in human history. As we have seen, everything rests on how Nietzsche's readers respond to the "spectacle" that is about to unfold around them (*GM* III: 27). Will they experience themselves as helpless victims of this calamity, or as its proud, triumphant instigators? Will they endure this spectacle as passive spectators, or will they take the stage as players in their own right, placing their trust in the direction provided by the "grand old eternal comic poet of our existence" (*GM* P7)? If Nietzsche's readers are not yet wise, they are likely to receive the collapse of Christian morality as a devastating blow to their efforts to lead a meaningful post-theistic existence. If they have managed to become wise, however, they will take their place onstage, thereby positioning themselves to behold—and affirm—the extra-moral future that may lie ahead.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Here I follow the translation suggested by Clark and Swensen, originally on p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> With the exception of occasional emendations, I rely throughout this essay on Walter Kaufmann's translations of Nietzsche's writings for Random House/Vintage Books. (In the case of his translation of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Kaufmann enlists and acknowledges the assistance of R.J. Hollingdale, who also translated *Daybreak* for Cambridge University Press.) Numbers refer to sections rather than pages, and the following key explains the abbreviations I use: CW: *The Case of Wagner, Beyond Good and Evil*; BT: *The Birth of Tragedy*; D: *Daybreak*; EH: *Ecce Homo*; GM: *On the Genealogy of Morals*; GS: *The Gay Science*; TI: *Twilight of the Idols*; Z: and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

<sup>3</sup> Nietzsche's sensitivity to the (unwanted) influence on him of Hegel is evident in his "review" of *The Birth of Tragedy*, which, sixteen years later, now "smells offensively Hegelian" to him (EH:bt 1). Translating the main thesis of *The Birth of Tragedy* into mock-Hegelese, Nietzsche offers the following synopsis of his first book: "An 'idea' [„Idee"]—the antithesis [*Gegensatz*] of the Dionysian and the Apollinian—translated into the realm of metaphysics; history itself as the development [*Entwicklung*] of this 'idea'; in tragedy this antithesis is sublimated into a unity [*zur Einheit augehoben*]; and in this perspective things that had never before faced each other are suddenly juxtaposed [*gegenüber gestellt*], used to illuminate each other, and comprehended [*begriffen*]—opera, for example, and the revolution" (EH:bt 1). As this passage confirms, Nietzsche believed that his readers would recognize the term he uses in GM III:27—*Selbstaufhebung*—as a staple of Hegelian philosophy and jargon.

<sup>4</sup> Nietzsche also refers to the "law of life" in TI "Morality" 6.

<sup>5</sup> My renewed interest in the failings of Zarathustra is indebted to Paul Loeb's new book, *The Death of Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Cambridge University Press, 2010). I should say, however, that Loeb does not share, and should not be held to account for, my suspicious interpretation of Zarathustra's embrace of Eternity.

<sup>6</sup> This assumption is supported by his later discussion of what he and his fellow "good Europeans" are prepared to sacrifice for their "faith" (GS 377).

<sup>7</sup> On the possibility and desirability of such a critique, see Janaway, pp. 229-33.

<sup>8</sup> Words such as *versuchen*, *Versuch*, and *Versuchung* acquire a heightened importance for Nietzsche in the writings from the post-Zarathustran period of his career. A *Versuch* is an *experiment* or an *attempt*, but it also suggests a *temptation* or *enticement*. Nietzsche called his 1886 Preface to the new edition of *The Birth of Tragedy* "An Attempt at a Self-Criticism" [*Versuch einer Selbstkritik*]. He also suggests *Versucher* as a name for the "new species of philosopher" that he sees "coming up" (BGE 42). The basic idea here is that a *Versuch* is possible only for those with an excessive health, such that they may survive and capitalize on the violence they direct against themselves.

<sup>9</sup> Nietzsche also claims this role for his "we" in D P4.

<sup>10</sup> The self-referential nature of their interrogation of the will to truth may be meant to anticipate, or perhaps facilitate, the "revaluation of all values," which Nietzsche elsewhere describes as "an act of supreme self-examination on the part of humankind, become flesh and genius in me" (EH: "destiny" 1). On the importance of this possible connection, see Owen, pp. 126-130.

<sup>11</sup> In its original context, the passage imported from GS 357 is followed by a discussion of how "Schopenhauer's question immediately comes to us in a terrifying way: *Has existence [Dasein] any meaning [Sinn] at all?*" (GS 357).

<sup>12</sup> I am indebted here to the interpretation developed by Hatab (2008a), pp. 158-64; see also Hatab (2008b), pp. 112-17.

<sup>13</sup> See Hatab (2008a), pp. 160-63.

<sup>14</sup> Initially presented by Nietzsche as prone to "miscount" the "twelve trembling bell-strokes of... [their] being," his best readers are presumed here to have matured sufficiently that they may secure meaning [*Sinn*] for their "whole being" (GM III:27).

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<sup>15</sup> The wisdom they stand to gain may be related to what Nietzsche elsewhere calls “*tragic wisdom*” (*EH:bt 3*).

<sup>16</sup> He elaborates on this vision of the future in *EH*: “*destiny*” 1.

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