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**Nietzsche and Heidegger: Questions on
Death and the Future of Life**

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From Plato right down to Heidegger's *Being and Time*, human life has been understood in its essential opposition to death. It is from out of its relation to death that life draws its potentialities, while the life bereft of such relation is essentially passive, one might even say, not quite alive. Thus life proper, as *Being and Time* has it, is an interminable dying, while the life that escapes death, animal life, is hardly worth that name. In the end, therefore, once we turn to the science of life, that is, to biology, such life becomes mechanical, the life of a perverted will, as Nietzsche says with respect to Darwinism.

And yet, as Nietzsche makes clear, the problem is here not that much that of a specific interpretation of life or of the will. We might be looking at Behaviourism, at Biology generally, or even at Freud's psychoanalytic rendition of the paralysis of life being trapped between *Eros* and *Thanatos*, or we might turn more generally to the humanist interpretation of human life, which Nietzsche characterizes in the *Antichrist*, as that life which is everything and therefore does not know where to turn¹. Thus it is not a question of what we think about life, rather what we are speaking about here is the history of the *Will to Truth* as the history of the West in which life has come to deny itself.

The age of the scientific world picture is then that of a culture of death. As Nietzsche says, "our natural sciences work towards a decline, in the aim of cognition generally. Our historical education aims at the death of all culture. It fights against all religion and thereby casually destroys all cultures"². In this process it works hand in hand with the philosophers, who worship "the deadly calm of the coldest concept, saying Nothing, that is, being"³.

In terms of the history of philosophy, then, life is possible insofar as it rests on death, which is to say, insofar as it orients itself towards cognition, towards knowledge. And yet, as is quite obvious,

knowledge presupposes life and so has the same interest in the preservation of life which every being has in its own continuing existence. Thus science requires a higher supervision and guarding: a *hygiene of life* is placed close beside science⁴

Consequently, it is often held that Nietzsche, in opposition to the 'rationalists' is an 'irrationalist', that instead of knowledge he values bodily instincts or emotions. And yet, while we could easily demonstrate here that the three great rationalists, Leibniz, Spinoza and Hegel, have had an inordinate influence on Nietzsche, I will

restrict myself to refer to the reason he gives for his vicinity to Spinoza, namely that for him as much as for the latter, knowledge is the highest affect.

And yet, if life even for Nietzsche relates essentially to knowledge, what does this do to the relation of life and death? What does it say about life as Will to Power? And how does Nietzsche then attempt to escape that culture of death that he has just criticised? In order to address these questions I will refer myself to Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's *Lebensphilosophie*. The questions posed will then run along the following lines:

- Does a philosophy of life remain metaphysical, in that it necessarily constitutes an exacerbation of Subjectivism?
- In other words, is every philosophy of life necessarily transcendental philosophy?

These are, in a nutshell, Heidegger's claims made against Nietzsche's thought. Confronting these two, we will thus have to make question-worthy the two central thoughts that seem to contradict each other most essentially: the fundamental perspective of life in Nietzsche and the question of being in Heidegger.

The less question-worthy 'life' becomes,
the more irrevocable the alienation from
Beyng.

Martin Heidegger

Having mentioned what essentially is contradictory in their thoughts, we should go on to point out the greatest vicinity of the two, being given in the understanding of history.

When Nietzsche speaks of the blood of the great philosophers flowing through his veins, then he means to say that a true philosophy has nothing subjective about it. When he uses the image of Zarathustra being struck down by a thought, his point is that the thinker does not make up a thought, does not 'own' a thought, but is owned by it. Equally, one could happily say of *Being and Time* what Heidegger has said of Nietzsche in the following quotation from *What is Called Thinking*:

In Nietzsche's thought that which now is comes to language, but to a language in which the tradition of occidental metaphysics of the last two millennia speaks, to a language that we all speak, that Europe speaks, just translated in manifold ways, but abraded, used up and without background. Plato and Aristotle still speak in our contemporary language. Parmenides and Heraclitus still think in our ways of representation.⁵

In terms of the critical setting-apart or *Auseinandersetzung* of Nietzsche and Heidegger, we can see this problem of the contradiction between their respective philosophies in a double sense: to set them apart means to open the difference between the retrospective interpretation of Greek philosophy and the prospective possibility of another beginning. Nietzsche's return to the Greek notion of justice as it arises out of Greek *Beredlichkeit* will thus be measured with respect to Heidegger's return to the original notion of truth as *aletheia*. Whether we are considering the

question of the *Will to Power* as a liberation of the will from revenge; whether we investigate the decision made by the *Eternal Return of the Same* between animal life and the *Overhuman*; whether we are thinking of knowledge as the highest affect; or whether we are turning our direction towards the schism inherent in the development of the sciences from their inception in Greece towards the modern 'scientific world-view', all these conceptions lead us back to the questions of life and history and depend on the interpretation of truth as justice along the genealogical difference between *di&kh* and *iustitia*⁶. This difference will show itself as the origin of that "hygiene of life" and that which it is to guard and supervise, namely science.

Life

I realized at around the same time [1876] that my instinct wanted the opposite of Schopenhauer's: a justification of life, even in its most horrid aspects, in its ambiguities and its most dishonest moments: — to bring this about I had the formula "Dionysian" in my hands.

KSA 12/354f

One might write a short summary on Nietzsche's works from the perspective of life as follows: From the *Birth of Tragedy* and the early essays on *The Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life* and *On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense* onwards, it has been clear that Nietzsche's thought and philosophical endeavour has turned around such a justification of life. His admiration for the Greeks is most powerfully expressed in the judgment that while we moderns are, without feeling, only capable of justifying the best of all possible worlds, the Greek could justify just about any world, even one from which the human intellect might feel alienated. His self-understanding as a reversal of Platonism takes as its fundamental revaluation the wresting of life from the clutches of death. In the essay on history, Nietzsche has thus given the first genealogical account of the alienation of life from itself and its consequent wilting in the historical malady. There is no philosophical recipe against such weakening of life; instead it is only life which can rejuvenate itself by means of that which Nietzsche in this essay calls 'a feeling of youth'. And philosophy is rather a consequence of such feeling. It is life itself that drives Nietzsche to philosophize and to see such philosophizing under the sign of the 'great health'. And once life has motivated philosophy, it takes it into its perspective. In other words, the grand problem of our age, the question of science, only becomes visible if approached from the perspective of art, while the phenomenon of art is not to be opened up via its objective nature, but, equally, from that which motivates it, that is, life.

Consequently, Nietzsche develops the idea of the philosopher as the physician of life and his first insight with respect to the history of philosophy is that 'up to now' many of those who have called themselves philosophers have not been Greeks but Egyptians, that is, the antithesis to the Greek, and "nothing actual has escaped from their hands alive"⁷. The thought of the *Eternal Return of the Same* is then the measurement of the strength of life. Its value seems not to be that of an 'intellectual thesis' which one might evaluate as either right or wrong; rather, understanding it life either affirms its rights or it goes to ruin. The thought of *Eternal Recurrence* is hence to effect a great crisis rather than a great insight. For those who

suffer from life, life will become insufferable, while the life that is animated by a strength of affect will find in that thought its 'highest confirmation and seal'.

One is thus not to evaluate life itself. The problem of metaphysics is here precisely that it tries to take a stance outside of life in order to bring it into perspective, to evaluate and to judge it, while every value insofar as it is of any value is so only from the perspective of life. It is for this reason that we finally abolish the true world and, necessarily, the world evaluated from this sight of death, namely the world of appearances. The philosopher hence develops the means to look at this world, so to speak, from within. And the most sublime name for this looking at the world from within is the *Will to Power*. The *Will to Power* is thus the last conception of Nietzsche. It does not replace any earlier thoughts, it does not stand against any of them, neither does it correct them. The *Will to Power* is that name of life which gives the whole of Nietzsche's thought its meaning. It is thus on account of the *Will to Power* that Nietzsche can say at this late stage of his work that all his work now wants one thing. Accordingly there is one last sentence of Nietzsche's work, written in June-July 1885, but meaningfully standing at the end of the book concoction called *The Will to Power*:

This world is the Will to Power — and nothing more! And you yourselves are this Will to Power — and nothing more (WP § 1067).

It is this, if radically simplified, understanding of philosophy in Nietzsche which Heidegger calls the last metaphysics. As such, Heidegger does not see a new metaphysical system in Nietzsche's work. As he clarifies in the *Contributions*: whatever comes after Hegel is only a decline into positivism, life-philosophy or doctrinal ontology⁸. We can thus see Nietzsche's thought developing from the fundamental metaphysical positions of Kant and Hegel. On the one hand, Nietzsche explicates the truth of Kantian transcendental philosophy by grounding it on the notion of life. On the other hand, he fulfils the interpretation of being as becoming developed in Hegel's thought.

With respect to the first point we might clarify the problem with reference to the Nietzsche lectures of Georg Picht. Picht sets the direction of his lectures as going through the Heideggerian critique and to make Nietzsche escape at the other end, by demonstrating how the properly understood notion of justice in Nietzsche makes him "explode the subjectivity of the subject"⁹. At the same time he happily describes Nietzsche's thought as transcendental philosophy and thus, in a differing sense, as inheritor of Kantian thought. But is it at all possible to speak of transcendental philosophy without subjectivity in the metaphysical sense? Heidegger certainly argues to the negative and adds to the overcoming of metaphysics the notion of dropping transcendental philosophy. And yet, is it meaningful to identify in such a way the form of subjectivity in Kant with the notion of life in Nietzsche? It certainly seems to be so, seeing that for Nietzsche everything that is of value and everything that is as such, is of such value and is what it is only from the perspective of life. This is, in the end, Nietzsche's point, that you are the *Will to Power* and nothing besides and that this world is the *Will to Power* and nothing besides. Following Leibniz, for Nietzsche the *Will to Power* makes the world as such appear as life. But if that is the case, Heidegger argues, than any further argument concerning the ek-stasis of life, might this be in pluralization or in temporalization,

remains inconsequential insofar as it would here merely stand out into the same. Heidegger's conclusion from here is that such idea of life-philosophy is the furthest away from the question of being and that, equally, everything living is essentially without history¹⁰.

This dimension of Heidegger's argument is too often overlooked and, consequently, one too often thinks to escape from Heidegger's criticism much too easily. We can see this point raising the example of Dieter Thomä, who writes in an essay called "A Philosophy of Life beyond Biologism and on this Side of the 'History of Metaphysics'" the following:

Heidegger's interpretation fails to do justice to Nietzsche's thought. In the course of his critique of subjectivity Nietzsche arrives at an internal pluralisation, at a 'societal structure' ... which already on the level of the individual gives rise to multiplicity – and consequently also to an external pluralisation of the *Will to Power* on the social level. This pluralisation belongs essentially to the perspectivism championed by Nietzsche but dealt with by Heidegger only to the extent that he can centre it onto the perceiving and willing subject or to fasten it to the 'body' understood as central command. ... That is why Werner Stegmaier makes the difference between Nietzsche's 'thinking otherwise of the individual in relation to other individuals without relation to a common third' and Heidegger's 'thinking otherwise of being in relation to beings'¹¹.

I have quoted this at length, because it can stand in for many various strands of critique pertaining that the simple idea of multiplicity or pluralism is, as such, anti-metaphysical, and because it makes quite clear why this argument does not really hold. The first part fails to address Heidegger's point precisely insofar as it does not seem to be aware that the notion of subjectivity is meant here not merely psychologically but metaphysically, that is, in the sense of the *hypokeimenon*, while the second part makes pretty clear that it would have to claim that even Leibniz would have had to be pronounced as the one who first and finally overcame metaphysical thought. Furthermore, on a methodological level, such an argument would neither agree with Heidegger nor with Nietzsche, insofar as it implies that one would need, in order to overcome metaphysics, nothing but a clever thought.

When Nietzsche motivates his philosophy against Kant, and does so even more accentuated with respect to the notion of justice, one might be able to see this motivation in line with Hegel's treatment of Kant. Kant, as Hegel has it, has left the ground germane to philosophical thinking. Hegel expresses this by referring to Kant's barbaric terminology¹² and his barbaric exposition (*VGP* 343). This barbarity, and I cannot really go into the argument fully here, this non-Greekness, lies precisely in the abstraction of his notion of subjectivity. The I as apperception of self-consciousness supposed to accompany every apperception, this is what he calls a barbaric exposition, whereby the barbaric nature is clarified as a lack of unity:

Thinking, the understanding remains something separate, sensibility something separate, both are united in an extrinsic, superficial fashion, like a piece of wood and a leg by means of a cord.¹³

What Kant is thus lacking, is that which Hegel calls, in the *Science of Logic*, life as the immediate idea¹⁴, whereby, at least for Hegel, the notion of a

transcendental philosophy, which he likewise calls barbaric, is equally overcome. And what Hegel here calls barbaric, Nietzsche similarly calls the lack of a great style.

Herewith we come to that crux which Hegel, Nietzsche and *Being and Time* bear in common. If in three different ways, we find these thoughts based on an explicit or implicit notion of life, even if, insofar as *Being and Time* is concerned, this is to clarify the fundamental metaphysical position of contemporary life.

In Hegel this is given in the fundamental idea of desire which gives rise to an understanding of the world as the product of human labour. When he distinguished between logical life, natural life and the spiritual life, the unity that desire gives to these is found in the absolute expression of absolute knowledge, whereby the individual recognizes itself in the world and identifies its objective existence with its subjective action. This foundation of life on the absolute concept is what Nietzsche turns around. Life is not the idea insofar as it is immediately given in order thus to overcome itself, but everything is what it is and insofar as it is from the perspective of life. The idea of the human being as *homo faber* here becomes absolute. There are only interpretations and interpretations of interpretations, and, Nietzsche asks, who interprets? Answer: the *Will to Power*. And this interpretation, the labour of the *Will to Power*, concerns not only the reality of past and future, but the essence of this *Will to Power* itself. It is with this in mind that the essential task of the *Will to Power* is determined as *Zucht* and *Züchtung*, as discipline and breeding.

To see science from the perspective of art and art from the perspective of life means to see our existence on the ground of such an action that produces the human being as much as its world, which reduces everything that is to that which can be grasped with the hand.

In Spring 1888 Nietzsche writes about the *Will to Power* as art:

The greatness of an artist is not measured by the 'beautiful feelings' that he excites: ... but by the extent to which he can approach the great style, to which he is capable of the great style. With the great passion this has in common that it does not care to please, that it forgets to persuade; but that it commands; that it **wants** To become master of the chaos that one is; to force one's chaos to become form; to become a formed necessity: logical, unambiguous, to become mathematics; to become **law** -: this is here the great ambition. With this one becomes repulsive. There is nothing left to stir love for such 'men of violence' [*Gewaltmenschen*]. [KSA 13/246f]

In other words, all that was necessary to turn Hegel onto his head was to base the notion of life not on the immediate idea, but on the body. Nietzsche, as Heidegger says in the lectures of the late 1930s, "has brought the metaphysically necessary subjectivism to its completion ... in that he has determined the living body to be the guiding thread of the interpretation of the world"¹⁵.

Life as the ground of art, artwork and handicraft: it is not far from the *Second Untimely Meditation* to *Being and Time*. Even though Heidegger has difficulties using the words 'life' and 'living body', even though the question 'who?' that can only be directed at *Dasein* and that is the only one that can be addressed to *Dasein*, is not the same as the *Will to Power*, it is still the case that the world is seen originally as that which is ready-to-hand and the work therefore shows at every step that 'Nietzsche is the one closest to us'.

The following judgement on 'biologism' in the widest sense of the word, can thus equally be applied to Nietzsche as to a rather common interpretation of *Being and Time*:

Life as acting and doing is a going further and hence a going away, and it is, consequently, directed beyond itself towards "meaning" and "value", i.e. it is "idealism"; and yet, one is immediately able to respond [to this claim of idealism], that one is not speaking of that life-form that represents and is "conscious", but of lived-experience and interaction, *life and lived experience*; this sounds rather "realistic" whilst still being able to afford, whenever necessary, its appearance as the highest idealism.

These ambiguities bestow an appearance of width and depth, while being the consequence of a complete groundlessness of this "thinking", which in a quite superficial manner and intentionally blind towards its historical descent falsifies whatever can be grasped with the hand into the highest being. And it does so with the questionable advantage immediately to find assent. (B 110/221f)

From here the notion of perspectivism and its essentially pluralistic quality finds its place in the doctrine of the *Will to Power*. While it understands cognition as the inner quarrel of the thinker, its affective qualities — which Nietzsche describes as making oneself many eyes, of seeing more and perceiving more — seem to be directed towards a more successful attempt to find one's place in the world, to secure one's existence. In the best sense, as Heidegger says, such an idea of truth can lead to the victorious yes-saying to existence, but in this it only fulfils modern subject metaphysics and is not too dissimilar from Hegel's conception of absolute knowing. The pluralization of perspectives is thus not at all an argument against Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. Rather as long as "to make oneself many eyes" is seen as an adaptive power of the *Will to Power*, as long as "to see more", "to hear more" belong to the subjectivity of life making its home in the world, truth as justice cannot be anything more than a reformulation of Greek *o(moi/wsij* and, consequently, Nietzsche will not have found happiness nor has he come to stand in the open after metaphysics. Instead, Nietzsche, at the height of his metaphysical thinking would himself have denied the Greek world in favour of the Roman world¹⁶.

Heidegger thus has to dare the critical setting-apart from Nietzsche precisely insofar as the latter is closest to him, and the distance that is opened up in this way is a distance within Heidegger's work itself, that is, the methodological step from the destruction of metaphysics to the critical setting-apart from metaphysics. We can rephrase this difference with respect to the development of the word *Dasein* within Heidegger's work. In *Being and Time* *Dasein* appears to be a description of human reality, that is, of the being that we are in each case ourselves. It is not identical with that which we call the human being, but it is the disclosed foundation of that which since Plato we understand as the human being in terms of the *zoon politicon*, or the *zoon logon echon*, or the *animal rationale*, etc. In the 1930s, however, *Dasein* becomes more and more that which is 'only' a possibility, the insertion [*Einsprung*] into which remains the possibility of an overcoming of the nihilism of the age of technology. In other words, our historical horizon is determined as this alternative between the *technologically fixed animal* and the *insertion into Dasein*. To understand the human being in terms of an essentially living being, a *Lebewesen*, is

therefore essentially to miss the essence of the human being. Heidegger here appears to be following Descartes, if for entirely different motives: the human being should not be understood at all as the symbolic *animal (animus or anima) plus something*. Rather, the human being is, to remain within Heidegger's praxis of tautology, human and not living, it is not *Lebewesen*, but *Menschenwesen*. In such *Wesen* it is what it is insofar as it indicates [zeigt] Being¹⁷. The danger of nihilism can thus be described as the collapse of the human being into its animal nature. Insofar as it thus has to distinguish itself from this biologicistic understanding, Heidegger distinguishes himself from Nietzsche. And yet, the distinction between *technologically fixed animal* and *insertion into Dasein* is isomorphic to that crisis which, according to Nietzsche, is to be brought about by the thought of the *Eternal Return of the Same*, namely that between *animal* and *Overhuman*. Once again, thus, it is shown that Nietzsche is the closest to us: this time uncomfortably close. Here one might seek the reason for Heidegger's presumed exclamation that Nietzsche has ruined him.

Against such life-philosophy the human being –or at least a few apart – have to prepare for the historical *Zeit-Spiel-Raum* and to collect themselves for a nearness to being which has to remain alien to all those who are *lebensnah*, that is, (too) close to life (cf. *B* 116/227). *And yet*, it is life itself which here escapes the 'closeness to life': "The 'living' will offer itself, as every objectifiable entity, to science as and in infinite possibility, and yet it will equally withdraw more and more from the sciences the more groundless these become."¹⁸

We have thus not yet spoken the last word on Nietzsche's philosophy of life. And, indeed, at the beginning of the Nietzsche lectures, already cautious about 'values', Heidegger says the following:

According to Nietzsche, those who posit the highest values, the creative human beings, and, first of all, the philosopher's, have to be experimenters and seducers [*Versuchende*]; they have to walk down ways and break up paths, knowing that they do not possess *the* truth. And yet, from this knowledge does not at all follow that they think of their concepts as chips in a game, so that they could exchange them at their will against any others; no, the consequence is quite the opposite: the absolute determination and obligation of thinking has to experience a foundation in the things themselves [*den Sachen selbst*], a foundation as to yet unknown by any prior philosophy. [*N* I 37]

This foundation is not to be seen anywhere else but in the notion of justice. And, insofar as this is a notion of justice or foundation "as to yet unknown to any prior philosophy", it is a notion opposed to that which underlies the metaphysical tradition.

Justice and Life

It is true, in other words, that Kant, for example, could equally be seen as a thinker who conceives of the philosopher as a "judge" and "legislator", but it is always this Kantian idea of justice that Nietzsche does not want to be confused with. Indeed, as Nietzsche says, "we think differently about justice"¹⁹ than Kant. The main contention in this objection to Kant lies in the construction of transcendental philosophy, which separates the human being from the world, so that it is human

reason that, according to Kant, prescribes the law to nature. The hubris of this position lies for Nietzsche in the idea that justice could be reduced to subjectivity, to the judgement of a judge who can preside over nature precisely insofar as he can separate himself from nature:

The whole pose of “man *against* the world”, of man as a “world-negating” principle, of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world [*Welten-Richter*] who in the end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it wanting — the monstrous insipidity of this pose has finally come home to us and we are sick of it. We laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of “man *and* world”, separated by the sublime presumption of the little word “and”.²⁰

The danger of mistaking Nietzsche’s philosopher for such a judge is not to be underestimated, especially seen that Heidegger is only a bit less guilty of it than many other, less careful interpreters. And yet, it is only by way of this differentiation from the modern idea of justice and judgement that it becomes possible to look for another conception of justice. Nietzsche’s claim is thus that we need a “new justice” (KSA 3/530), thought of as the basis of truth, a justice that requires us radically to rethink the identification of truth and knowledge.

True justice, for Nietzsche, takes the form of an affect, or what Heidegger calls a fundamental attunement. It is not spoken from the position of a *Weltenrichter*, but speaks to me, determines knowledge as the highest affect: “Justice confronted me: thus I destroyed my Idols and shamed myself. I repented and forced my eye to look where it did not want to: and hither to carry its love” (VII 1[450], KSA 10/430).

The critical setting-apart, which was to transport us into a fundamental attunement thus finds that it could not quite move us far enough, as it has failed to make Nietzsche “come to a standstill on this side of the transition”.

Following a description of how the world of the farmer arises from the emotion of value, the artist’s from colour, the world of prehistoric man from anguish and ours from the desire for security — until we can see why Nietzsche says that finally there are only moral experiences —, he asks whether justice has any meaning here and answers: “when we are on the way of justice, then the arbitrary, fantastic interpretations, with which we have hurt and violated things, die: because their *real* [*wirkliche*] qualities assert their right, and, finally, we have to value them higher than ourselves” (KSA 9/261). This true notion of justice is, then, a step away from the humanistic identification of the world as a human world, a step in the direction of the ‘naturalisation’ of “humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature” (KSA 3/469). This foundation of thought in the things themselves will finally lead to the denegation of the autonomy of reason, to the explosion of the subjectivity of the subject, that is, to the overcoming of metaphysics. But what are we talking about when speaking of these *things themselves*? Nietzsche intimates an answer to this question in the following quotation: “we who are of a mixed nature, now heated up by fire, now cooled down by spirit, wish to fall to our knees before justice, as the only Goddess that we accept above us”.²¹

We can, then, conclude again on the question why Nietzsche has ruined Heidegger and why Heidegger has brought to ruin Nietzsche’s hope to find in Heidegger someone who might have made his truths incredible, namely that Nietzsche is not only the one closest to us, but that he has as well made some inroads into the question of being.

Notes

¹ Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Antichrist", in: *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*, (Penguin) London 1968, § 1, p. 125.

² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nachlaß*, III 4 [68], KSA 7/480. Nietzsche's Fragments quoted from the KSA vols. 7-13. (*Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe*, edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Berlin/New York (1967-77) 1988) All fragments are quoted with the reference to the KGW, i.e. vols. III-VIII, followed by the series number and the fragment number in square brackets, so that the reference is possible to both the KGW and the KSA without the need for a reference table. "Unsre Naturwissenschaft geht auf den Untergang, im Ziele der Erkenntniß, hin. Unsre historische Bildung auf den Tod jeder Kultur. Sie kämpft gegen die Religionen — nebenbei vernichtet sie die Kulturen".

³ Friedrich Nietzsche, "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks", KSA 1/844, "die starre Todesruhe des kältesten, Nichts sagenden Begriffs, des Seins".

⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life* (Hackett: Indianapolis 1980) p. 62.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Was heißt Denken*, (Niemeyer) Tübingen (1954) ⁴1984, p. 71.

⁶ I have developed Nietzsche's thought on the genealogical difference of the term justice elsewhere and in more detail. While having to repeat some of the points made there, I would still like to refer to "Nietzsche on Truth and Justice", forthcoming in the 2010 edition of *New Nietzsche Studies*.

⁷ Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols", in: *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*, p. 45.

⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 65, (Klostermann) Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 213.

⁹ See Georg Picht, "Nietzsche – Thought and the Truth of History", *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 2007, p. 8.

¹⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Besinnung*, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 66, (Klostermann) Frankfurt a. M. 1997, p. 182.

¹¹ Dieter Thomä, "Eine Philosophie des Lebens jenseits des Biologismus und diesseits der 'Geschichte der Metaphysik'", in *Heidegger und Nietzsche: Heidegger Jahrbuch 2*, Alber: Freiburg & München 2005, p. 278.

¹² Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 3, Werke 20, (Suhrkamp) Frankfurt a. M. 1970, page 337; from now on referred to in the text as VGP, followed by page number.

¹³ VGP 348; "Denken, Verstand bleibt ein Besonderes, Sinnlichkeit ein Besonderes, die auf äußerliche, oberflächliche Weise verbunden werden, wie ein Holz und Bein durch einen Strick".

¹⁴ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Vol. 2, Werke 6, (Suhrkamp) Frankfurt a. M. 1970, page 470.

¹⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, two volumes, Pfullingen (1961) 1989, vol 1. P. 655; Nietzsche hat "den metaphysisch notwendigen Subjektivismus dadurch zur Vollendung gebracht ... haben, dass er den Leib zum Leitfaden der Weltauslegung bestimmte".

¹⁶ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1996, p. 54.

¹⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Was heißt Denken*, (Niemeyer) Tübingen (1954) ⁴1984, p. 95.

¹⁸ Das ‚Lebendige‘ wird wie alles Gegenstandsfähige dem Fortschritt der Wissenschaft endloses Möglichkeiten bieten und sich doch zugleich mehr und mehr entziehen, je grundloser zugleich die Wissenschaft wird. (B 154, 276)

¹⁹ KSA 9/301.

²⁰ *Gay Science*, § 346, p. 286.

²¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzu Menschliches*, vol. I, § 637, KSA 2/362.