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**«Love and Kisses to the Whole World»: On
Nietzsche's Empedocles**

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Keep sober, keep sober and remember to doubt.

— Lucian

Who is Zarathustra's Overman?

This work is Lucian's, who well knew
The foolishness of times gone by,
For things the human race finds wise
Are folly to th' unclouded eye.

— Erasmus¹

It is still common to assume that Nietzsche's *Übermensch* corresponds, more or less coincidentally, more or less historically, to Hitler's fantasy, a superior warrior, a perfect soldier, the fruit of science or at least *good breeding*, by which one means a family of a certain economic wherewithal, thus the beneficiary of a certain "good" education, nutrition, environment, travel, etc.² And this view is common stock among the Straussians, by which I mean here such authors as Michael Gillespie from the side of political theory and Lawrence Lambert from the side of philosophy.³

But one ought not suppose oneself immune, even, if one cannot be called a Straussian. For the whole of technologically oriented society via the fantasy of genetic engineering and associated technologies as well as the fantasy life that is the internet and the media in general presupposes the same vision of the human per se and in general as supreme, as other, as "higher," in Nietzsche's words. If Nietzsche opposes Darwinism in one thing, namely in the conviction that today's species represent improvements or developments over past species, surely he shares the values of Darwin in associating humans and apes and sometimes counting them lower than the apes, rather than the angels.

Empedocles supposed that our age is the age of extinction, the time of strife or hatred, precisely because of the killing that we cannot seem to stem. We eat the flesh of animals whom we kill in order to cut slices from their bodies and limbs to roast and boil and steam them and sometimes even to eat them raw. Most of us dress in the

skins or fur or hair of animals (this animal hair is what we call wool and cashmere, etc.). Most of us eat animal flesh for no other reason than that we like the taste (this is the biggest counter-argument contra vegetarianism), or because it's what we have always done. This is the famous bandwagon argument: everyone is doing it, which only fuels an industry to supply animal body parts, raised or hunted down in the wild for the purpose of human consumption: the restaurant industry, the street food industry, the supermarket industry, viewed from a globally environmental perspective this industry yields the market for and the byproduct of bushmeat that is part of the environmental disaster that is the unstoppable development of the African continent, that is, for its part, nothing other than an apocalypse for every animal that had previously dwelt in those now developed and cultivated lands.

The father lifts up his own son changed in form and slaughters him with a prayer, blind fool, as he shrieks piteously, beseeching as he is killed. But he deaf to his cries slaughters him and makes ready in his halls an evil feast. In the same way son seizes father and children their mother, and tearing out life they eat the flesh of those they love. (KRS 415; DK 137)

Classicists are fond of linking Empedocles' prohibition of carnivorousness with metempsychosis, despite the obvious stupidity of such a link (but scholars never let such trivial details as the stupidity of a reading get in their way, as Nietzsche writes alluding to Lobeck in *The Birth of Tragedy*). Thus one reads again and again that Empedocles argues that one ought not eat meat as one might thereby be eating one's recently deceased brother or father (assuming the situation applies in the first place). But the animal for Empedocles is brother to you in the same way that Schiller's poem *An die Freude*, the "Ode to Joy," urges the Christian idealist vision for all humanity as brothers under heaven: *Alle Menschen werden Brüder*. Simone de Beauvoir concludes her *The Second Sex* by speaking, to the great annoyance of feminists all over the world, of *fraternité* in the same sense.

But Empedocles is speaking, as Nietzsche would speak (this is the ontological meaning of the will to power),⁴ of the fundamental relatedness of all living things. We are not "other" than animals and we are certainly not — consider only what we do! — "higher." The animal you barbecue *is* your brother, physiologically, biologically speaking, not a one that *could be* in some spiritualist sense, your literal (i.e., genetically human) brother, or son. This that you do to the least of your neighbors, the least of your brethren, this you do to the Christ. So we have heard from the man Nietzsche named the only Christian, the one who hung on the cross and — the one who died for the things he said.

Beyond Nietzsche's reading of Empedocles' carnivorousness, the notion of the overman may be anything but a goal or an advance.⁵ And in this sense, after speaking (shades of Empedocles, shades of Emerson) of the need for purification "What does your body say about your soul? Is your soul not poverty and dirt and a miserable ease. In truth, man is a polluted river." (Ibid.), Zarathustra reflects on greatness as opposed to the image of such. In the next section on the "most contemptible man: the Ultimate man," he speaks first of surface "translations" as well as subterranean "translations" (just as Rohde will do in succeeding chapters of his *Psyche* published in the years after

Nietzsche's collapse. 1890-1894): "What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in man is that he is going-across and a downgoing." (Z, *Zarathustra's Prologue*, 4)

But like the people to whom Zarathustra speaks, his words are not for our ears. Hence Nietzscheans and anti-Nietzscheans alike *believe* in the overman; we assume we all are the overman, at least potentially, at least in some sense, perhaps by comparison with the slave or slavely moral, the dominant species and in comparison with the ape. The human, all-too-human is the overman.

The Overman in Hell

Every scholar knows that Nietzsche's *Übermensch* is a coinage taken or derived from Lucian, a Syrian rhetorician (125-180), author of numerous satirical plays, including the *Dialogue of the Gods*, *The Dialogue of the Dead*, and the *Journey into Hell*. Every scholar *knows* this because Walter Kaufmann tells us so and every account I have read duly cites Kaufmann and the citation is easy to find and very simple, "*Kataplous*, 16."⁶ Kaufmann does not provide the context and this may have been because Kaufmann, unlike Nietzsche, was not a philosopher, but a philologist, a Germanist or historian of ideas, and such was simply interested in the coinage per se (and Kaufmann's interest would seem to have set the tone for the positivism of source scholarship to this day). But if one reads Lucian's own ΚΑΤΑΠΛΟΥΣ Η ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΣ, i.e., *A Voyage to the Underworld or the Tyrant*,⁷ a reading, surprisingly enough, rarely undertaken, one finds an intriguing insight into the notion of the "overman." Lucian articulates it in high-satiric, indeed, and this is where it gets interesting, in the very same Menippean satiric fashion that Nietzsche refers to at the conclusion of his *Ecce Homo*, „What I owe the Ancients.“ Thus if I am right, the notion of the Overman would ironically, parodically link the beginning and the end of Nietzsche's career.⁸

For his part, the story Lucian tells in his play on the tyrant's rather literal downgoing, tells the instructive morality tale of those who appear in everyday life in an apparent or supposed guise as „Higher-Men“ but who are revealed as being no more than or merely all-too-human as soon as they cross over into the underworld (or as in the case in question in Lucian's text, those very unwillingly dragged into the afterlife, just as the dwarf leaps after the tightrope walker or ‚overman‘ at the start of Zarathustra, and similarly threatens to drag him down into hell): So we read Lucian's *Kataplous*: "The 'superman' [υπεράνθρωπος] is the superior man, a king among men, a man of power like a tyrant." All these political attributes allow the speaker to regard the tyrant (and this is the subtitle of Lucian's satire), "a superman in my eyes, someone thrice blessed, nothing short of an Adonis a foot and a half taller than the rest of mankind."⁹ But, so Lucian's satire continues, "when he died and had to take off his trappings, not only did he look ridiculous to me, but I had to laugh at how ridiculous *I* was. Imagine — I had stood in awe of that trash and had jumped to the conclusion that he was divinely happy on the basis of the smells from his kitchen and the color of his robes."¹⁰ Lucian goes on to mock the moneylenders, and so on.

In Rhode's *Psyche*, we read of „the method of Incubation, or temple sleep,“ by which questions might be put to a number of daimones and Heroes). He explains that

this mantic technique „was based on the assumption that the daimon who was only visible indeed to mortal eyes in the higher state achieved by the soul in dreams, had his permanent dwelling at the seat of the oracle.“¹¹ If David Allison is right to remark that Zarathustra spends an inordinate amount of time, counted in days rather than hours, sleeping „as one dead,“¹² one can assume that Zarathustra’s „dropping off“ is meant to allude to Rohde’s „incubation-oracles.“¹³

Beyond Rohde’s *Psyche* and beyond Lucian’s antiquity (it is not Rohde who emphasizes the notion of the overman, it takes Nietzsche to do this), how are we to understand Nietzsche’s overman, as this notion is arguably one of the most popularly influential of all.¹⁴ Indeed in its Aryan configuration, set into what some claim to have been its original constellation in Nietzsche’s *Der Wille zur Macht* (that infamously “invented” book), the idea of the *Übermensch* is held to be the causal factor in not only Hitler’s war but also the first world war (which was itself also called, instructively, fatally enough, “Nietzsche’s war” by journalists of the day).¹⁵

In other words, so far from love and kisses to the entire world, when we talk about Nietzsche’s *Übermensch*, we would seem to be talking about the philosophy that generated the language of the master-race, i.e., the *Übermensch* as opposed to the *Unter-Mensch* as Nazi terminology also speaks of it.

Nietzsche uses both terms. Yet as the reference to Lucian makes plain (and Nietzsche’s own emphasis on the rhetorical importance of Mennipean satire also makes this patent) Nietzsche’s Zarathustra teaches the *Übermensch* in a *parodic* fashion. It is therefore a satiric notion, a point which does little to make his meaning clear. This does not mean that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra does not teach the *Übermensch* — of course he does that — but it is easy to fail to note (certainly even many sophisticated and sensitive Nietzsche scholars do so) that the elusive doctrine of the eternal return, the doctrine that Zarathustra comes to teach, the teaching that the overman himself or herself is meant to be the passage toward, is the eternal return of the *same*.

Thus Nietzsche’s Zarathustra teaches that the human is charged to overcome or to get beyond or to get over the human. Hence we have a number of readings of the posthuman or overhuman, recent scholarship takes this argument to what such scholars like to call the “trans-human” condition and it is thus a pro-cybernetic move in the direction if not of the robotic, than at the least of the very modest cyborg that is a kid texting a friend, a man masturbating with an internet connection, or just contact lenses, or a pacemaker, or what have you.

Nietzsche however is not talking about cyborgs or transhumans as much as he is — this is where the reference to the becoming of life is essential — talking about humans *and* other animals. For Nietzsche is not persuaded that we are, as he says, either “other” or “higher” than the animals. In this sense, one might want to consider the kinship with nature that can make us accuse Nietzsche of a Goethean *Naturmystik* but, and even then, we would miss the point Nietzsche seeks to underscore with his *Übermensch*, if we once conceive it as a satirical expression.¹⁶

By now it should be a bit more evident that context makes all the difference, not just for Nietzsche but for Lucian. For Lucian’s provocative contrast highlights the superficial vision of the overman, the man of the world who towers above others in this-worldly life, and the same man once translated or transposed into the afterlife,

illuminated, as it were, in the dark darkness rather than the light of eternity. This belongs to what I have named Nietzsche's *reflection* on perspective per se not his "perspectivism" (as the analysts insist on saying but and much rather), but his *perspectivalism*, considering the values we have in our culture and context as contrasted with our tendency to take these values, not only as universal but as timeless or essential.

Empedocles and death, Zarathustra and the Isles of the Blest

Their altar was not drenched by the unspeakable slaughters of bulls, but this was held among men the greatest defilement — to tear out the life from noble limbs and eat them.

— Empedocles

If we note Empedocles' egregious egotism, as argued above, we tend to dismiss his reflections on carnivorism, which alone among commentators Nietzsche reads accurately, writing:

Empedocles sought to impress the oneness of all life most urgently, that carnivorism is a sort of self-cannibalism [*Sichselbstverspeisen*]), a murder of the nearest relative. He desired a colossal purification of humanity, along with abstinence from beans and laurel leaves.¹⁷

Now beans are among the Pythagorean's taboos and laurel leaves are associated both with Apollo and the traditional victor as well as with tyrants. Leaving the question of kingship for the moment, the Pythagorean question of rebirth is common to both Empedocles and Nietzsche in the doctrine of eternal recurrence.

More than Empedocles' caution against carnivorism, more than his cosmological cycle (although and to be sure this matters to Nietzsche), it is the tableau of the volcano and the philosopher's voluntary death that strikes us most powerfully. And then too there is the dramatic detail of a single bronze sandal, tossed up and back to the land of the living by the same volcano. *Why just one?* Would it not have been vaporized or melted? This is so even where Diogenes Laertius begins with a veritable catalogue of the various ways Empedocles was said to have exited this world.¹⁸

Carl Gustav Jung refers to an account of Nietzsche's Zarathustra in his lecture course on Zarathustra that would seem to echo this constellation of death. Whether it is self-willed or not, and therefore an image of death in life, of intimations of mortality, at least as set together with Lucian's *Kataplous*, Jung himself does not explore this particular conjunction. As his point of departure, Jung's discussion engages "The Blessed Isles" and "Of Great Events" as these appear in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

Most of us will recall the Zarathustran passage in question: it's weird and not just because Jung says so, if Zarathustra scholars rarely remark upon this wackiness, and I

remember reading it for the first time and for the 127th time or for however many hundreds of times I have read it, but always without much sense. But it is worth thinking about such things, especially with reference to Nietzsche who spent his life engaged with such oddities often unquestioned by supposedly critical scholarship.¹⁹

Thus in his seminar from 4 May 1938 Jung glosses the account in Zarathustra as

the descent of Zarathustra into Hades. There is the volcano and the fire underneath, the entrance to the interior of the earth, the entrance to the underworld — there is even old Cerberus, the fire dog — and Zarathustra is now going down into all this. Psychologically it would mean that after all that great talk, there is an underworld and down there one has to go. But if one is so high and mighty, why not stay up there? Why bother about this descent? Yet the tale says inevitably one goes down — that is the *enantiodromia* — and when one gets down there, well one will be burned up, one will dissolve.²⁰

Jung observes that Nietzsche would have had to have recognized this as the locus classicus of the Dorian city of Acragas but, as Jung reflects, Nietzsche's Zarathustran account does not allude to Empedocles. Nevertheless, Jung rightly remarks that the story "has a very peculiar ring."²¹

It was so funny — the noontide hour and the captain and his men — what was the matter with that ship that they go to shoot rabbits near the entrance of hell? Then it slowly came to me that when I was about eighteen, I had read a book from my grandfather's library, *Blätter aus Prävorst* by Kerner, a collection in four volumes of wonderful stories, about ghosts and phantasies and forbodings, and among them I found that story. It is called "An extract of awe-inspiring import from the log of the ship 'Sphinx', in the year 1686 in the Mediteranean."²²

Jung here refers to the *Die Seherin von Prevorst. Eröffnungen über das innere Leben der Menschen und über das Hereinragen einer Geisterwelt in die unsere*, written by a Suabian poet Justinus Kerner, a story teller of tales of spiritualist, mesmerist, and magnetic qualities. The 1829 volumes appeared in 1855 in English translation as *The Seeress of Prevost*. It matters of course, although Jung does not mention this that Kerner (1786-1862), had helped care for Hölderlin as a medical student and had later arranged the publication of his work.

Let us recall the passage from the section entitled *Of Great Events*,

There is an island in the sea — not far from the Blissful Islands of Zarathustra — upon which a volcano continuously smokes; the people, and especially the old women among the people, say that it is placed like a block of stone before the gate of the underworld, but that the narrow downward path which leads to this gate of the underworld passes through the volcano itself. (*Z, Of Great Events*)

The passage could not be more obviously related to Lucian, and not less to Rohde's broader constellation of his exploration into *Psyche. The Cult of Souls & The Belief in Immortality Among the Greeks*.

Jung goes on to cite Kerner's original text for his students's sake:

"The four captains and a merchant, Mr Bell, went ashore on the island of Stromboli to shoot rabbits. At three o'clock they called the crew together to go aboard, when, to their inexpressible astonishment, they saw two men flying rapidly over them through the air. One was dressed in black, the other in grey. They approached them very closely, in the greatest haste; to their greatest dismay they descended amid the burning flames into the crater of the terrible volcano, Mt. Stromboli. They recognized the pair as acquaintances from London."²³

Same story Jung says, a surmise he duly checks by asking Elisabeth Förster Nietzsche, who confirms that she and her brother found this book in the library of their own "grandfather, Pastor Oehler."²⁴

Jung notes that "such stories are recorded because they are edifying," as Jung explains: "The two gentlemen from London were big merchants and evidently they were not quite alright, because they are painted with the colors of hell which express sinfulness, one is black and the other grey, whereas they should be wearing white shirts which is court dress in heaven."²⁵

The ghostly dimension as the reference above to Lucian and to Rohde now makes plain, is literal rather than literary. If Gary Shapiro is right to point to the geological significance of the contrast of this passage with the Isles of the Blest where Zarathustra "appears mysteriously on a volcanic island (where his Shadow seems to fly into the volcano itself),"²⁶ most commentators fail to note that Zarathustra's shadow or *shade* corresponds for the ancient Greek to the flattened dimensionality that is the only thing that remains of us after death. Hence with respect to the claim that it is, as Nietzsche's Zarathustra repeats, "high time," that it is therefore late — "it's time, it's time" as T.S. Eliot calls, as Gadamer once spoke of age as including so many "warning shots across the bow" — so, too, Jung explains that "This is the secret, this is the key to the meaning of that descent into hell. It was a warning; soon you will go down into dissolution."²⁷

Coda

When anyone sins and pollutes his own limbs with bloodshed, who by his error makes false the oath he swore – spirits whose portion is long life – for thrice ten thousand years he wanders apart from the blessed, being born throughout that time in all manner of forms of mortal things, exchanging one hard path of life for another. The force of the air pursues him into the sea, the sea spews him out onto the

floor of the earth, the earth casts him into the
rays of the blazing sun

— Empedocles

When Nietzsche writes in his *Zarathustra* that man is something to be overcome or characterizes the human lifetime in his notes as a “line stretched between 2 nothingnesses,” he points to a perspective beyond the here and now, one which asks us to consider not the immediate, whether in terms of economic advantage or personal delight or pleasure, but rather the scope or scheme of the world. Thus Nietzsche does not say *The little businessman is will to power and nothing besides*, much less *The German nationalist is will to power and nothing besides*, but *The world is will to power and nothing besides* — meaning thereby the collective whole of existence in the world (and indeed beyond the earth). In this sense, he has recourse to biological metaphors and from this same perspective he also emphasizes that the aim of life is expression not survival (only, he says, rather unkindly, the Englishman strives for life at all costs).

We are confused by this. This limitation can block our understanding of Nietzsche’s emphasis upon the artistic expression or impulse of life —as a drive common to starfish and to humans alike, or better said as an artistry common to the morphology of Haeckel’s *radiolaria* and to human beings, at least as Leonardo displays the human being inscribed as the spokes of what could well seem to be an Empedoclean sphere.

Nietzsche’s own reference is to the *Urkünstler*, as Stoics and Anaxagoras and Anaximander called mind or *noûs*. Yet Nietzsche also draws the parallel between Empedocles and “Darwinian theory”²⁸ and a certain materialism. If that be design, then and beyond Empedocles, Nietzsche must be aligned with those who argue for intelligent design in the sense not of the Judeo-Christian God and not of Gaia, but of another schema altogether, one that Nietzsche once called *aeon*, reminding us that the child had kingship, playing with chance, playing with “*chance forms*” as he puts in his notes on Empedocles, playing that is to say, “every possible random combination of elements, of which some are purposive and capable of life.”

Recalling my own references to chance²⁹ and noting that, as Robin Small remarks, Nietzsche returns to his reading of Lucian to recount Heraclitus’ playful playing upon the kingship of the child, in the worlds and words of *pais*, *paizon*, *pesseuon*, *sumpheromenos*, *diapheromenos*: “A child playing, moving counters, gathering and scattering,”³⁰ Nietzsche reminds us, that with Empedocles, but let us also add with Newton (and with Bachelard too), science “basically dissolves into magic.”

Notes

¹ After Christopher Robinson, *Lucian and his Influence in Europe*, citing the epigram to Aldine edition of Erasmus, *In Praise of Folly* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 191.

² With regard to the question of the *Übermensch* as a philosophical notion with reference to Nietzsche, Rudolf Eisler's *Handwörterbuch der Philosophie* (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1913) repays reading. For an overview, see Ernst Benz: "Das Bild des Übermenschen in der Europäischen Geistesgeschichte" in his *Der Übermensch. Eine Diskussion* (Stuttgart: Rhein-Verlag 1961), pp. 19-161. See too Karen Joisten, *Die Überwindung der Anthropozentrität durch Friedrich Nietzsche* (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1994), esp. pp. 172ff.

³ Michael Allen Gillespie, "'Slouching Toward Bethlehem to Be Born': On the Nature and Meaning of Nietzsche's Superman," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 30 (2005) 49-69 and see too Lawrence Lambert's *Nietzsche's Teaching*.

⁴ See Babich, "Ontologie," in: Christian Niemeyer, ed., *Nietzsche-Lexikon* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), p. 257-260.

⁵ It is not that it has never occurred to anyone that the *Übermensch* might be a parodic concept: Keith Ansell-Pearson has argued that Nietzsche lays out a parodic path his 1886 preface to *Human, All Too Human*. "Toward the *Übermensch*: Reflections on the Year of Nietzsche's Daybreak," *Nietzsche-Studien* 23 (1994): 128–30. Richard Perkins sees these figures as the lover, the knower, and the creator. "How an Ape Becomes a Superman: Notes on a Parodic Metamorphosis in Nietzsche," *Nietzsche-Studien* 15 (1986): 180. Here I simply attend to the classical echoes of parody and I note that without underscoring the parodic dimension, Marie-Luise Haase sees the figures of the *Übermensch* as saint, philosopher, and artist: "Der Übermensch in Also Sprach Zarathustra und im Zarathustra Nachlass, 1882–1885," *Nietzsche-Studien* 13 (1984): 236. Eugen Fink argues for the genius, the free spirit, and Zarathustra himself, *Nietzsches Philosophie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960), pp. 72ff.

⁶ I give the footnote in its entirety. See Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), footnote 1: p. 307. The footnote clarifies Kaufmann's main text: "The *hyperanthropous* is to be found in the writings of Lucian in the second century AD and Nietzsche as a classical philologist had studied Lucian and made frequent references to him in his philologia." *Ibid.* Erkme Joseph, *Nietzsche im "Zauberberg"* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1996) duly cites Kaufmann in his notes before going on to detail the earlier appearances of the term *Übermensch* as such in German, pp. 271ff.. These same details also appear in Karen Joisten, cited below, and so too with reference to anthropology and the social sciences Jyung-Hyun Kim, *Nietzsches Sozialphilosophie: Versuch einer Überwindung der Moderne im Mittelpunkt des Begriffes Leib*, (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1995), Note 239, pp. 198ff. See for a recent more theoretically politicized overview, Ulrich Busch, "Vergessene Utopien: Friedrich Nietzsches Vision vom Übermenschen," *Utopie kreativ*, 151 (Mai 2003): 460-667.

⁷ See the mid-19th century Loeb edition Lucian or else the Everyman library edition, translated by Lionel Casson, *Selected Satires of Lucian* (New York: Norton, 1968), pp. 175-193.

⁸ But Northrop Frye had already laid the groundrules or gone to the underground for English readers. See Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*, (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1957), p. 232.

⁹ Lucian, *Kataplous* "The Journey to the Underworld or the Tyrant." [16]

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Rhode, *Psyche*, Vol. 1, p. 92.

¹² Allison

¹³ Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 93.

¹⁴ See however Cardew, "The Dioscuri: Nietzsche and Erwin Rohde" in Paul Bishop, *Nietzsche and Antiquity* (Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 2004), pp. 458-478.

¹⁵ See William Macintire Salter, "Nietzsche and War" in Tracy Strong, ed., *Friedrich Nietzsche* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 3-26. See also Strong's introduction and my own discussion of this in Babich, "Nietzsche's Will to Power: Politics and Destiny," in Strong, ed., *Friedrich Nietzsche*, pp. 281-296.

¹⁶ Cf. Nietzsche HH, *Mixed Opions and Maxims* 1879 § 408 und Erwin Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1900). In this context, Rohde further emphasises that one must trace to the very idea of „travelling in the underworld, for the sake of philosophical knowledge.“ p. 261. But today, and indeed with no kind of reference to Erwin Rohde let alone to Nietzsche or to the charming notion that it was no one other than Dionysus who is said to have charmed Cerberos, Peter Kingsley has taken up this old image in his *In the Dark Places of Wisdom* (Inverness: The Golden Sufi Center, 1999).

¹⁷ Nietzsche, *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, p. 109.

¹⁸ This indeed is the point of departure for the classicist Eva Chitwood's monograph, *Death by Philosophy: The Biographical Tradition in the Life and Death of the Archaic Philosophers Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Democritus* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

¹⁹ In general, when scholars say they are puzzled, they are usually halfway to dismissing the issue. The scholarly epoché brackets what does not make sense.

²⁰ Jung, *Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, pp. 2116-2117.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2117.

²² Jung, *Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, p. 2117. Jung's reference is to Justinus Andreas Christian Kerner, *Die Seherin von Prevorst. Eröffnungen über das innere Leben der Menschen und über das Hereinragen einer Geisterwelt in die unsere* (1829). In English as *The Seeress of Prevozt*, trans. Catherine Crowe, (New York: Partridge & Brittan, 1855). I add here that Robin Small in *Nietzsche and Reé* refers to Jung and to Kerner but does not make the connection with Lucian or Rhode nor indeed Hölderlin/Heinse.

²³ Jung, *Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, pp. 1217-1218.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2118. The coincidence is plausible enough even without Elisabeth's confirmation.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Gary Shapiro, "Beyond Peoples and Fatherlands: Nietzsche's Geophilosophy and the Direction of the Earth," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 35-36 (2008): 9-27, here p. 13.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1224.

²⁸ Nietzsche, *Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, p. 116.

²⁹ See Babich, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science in the Light of Art and Life* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 160ff as well as "Nietzsche's 'Artists' Metaphysics' and Fink's Ontological 'World-Play,'" *International Studies in Philosophy*, XXXVII/3 (2005): 163-180.

³⁰ Robin Small, "Nietzsche and Cosmology," in Keith Ansell-Pearson, ed., *Companion to Nietzsche* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 189-207, here p. 203.