Donovan Miyasaki

Wright State University, EE. UU.
Assistant Professor

Ph.D., University of Toronto. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Wright State University. His research includes Freud, Heidegger, and the Frankfurt School. He is currently working on the political implications of Nietzsche’s ethical philosophy.

Abstract

Breeding as Natural Morality

In this paper, I clarify Nietzsche’s troubling notion of the morality of breeding or cultivation (Züchtung). I defend it as a naturalist morality that promotes life and human flourishing. I begin by arguing that breeding should be interpreted metaphorically as the socially conditioned production of character types through habitual, incorporated behavior. I then place Nietzsche’s contrast of breeding and taming in the context of his broader categories of noble and slavish, natural and anti-natural, moralities. Moral breeding is a noble form of evaluation because it begins with affirmation and cultivation of character traits, in contrast to the slavish form of taming, which begins by identifying harmful traits for elimination. Breeding is consequently a natural morality because it affirms human nature and life, while taming condemns fundamental aspects of human nature and life.
I defend this point by contrasting the two moralities’ attitude toward three characteristics of life emphasized by Nietzsche: life 1) is essentially the enhancement and manifestation of power, 2) consists of force relations that produce differences in an unending becoming, and 3) is characterized by necessity—each being is determined by the history of, and its place within, all things. The primary distinction is that breeding selects for traits, while taming deselects traits. Breeding cultivates abilities to manifest power, while taming disables and weakens. It promotes the proliferation of differences, affirming life as becoming, while taming eliminates differences through the actualization of a final, universal moral ideal. Furthermore, breeding affirms the necessity of all traits, not just the highest or selected ones, in contrast to taming, which seeks to prevent the cultivation of deselected traits.
Next, I consider two objections. The first objection is that moral breeding is conducive to ethically dangerous views such as social Darwinism and eugenics. I argue that these views, as is clear from their emphasis upon negative, reactionary concepts of purity and degeneration, are deselecting moralities that fall squarely into Nietzsche’s categories of the anti-natural, the slavish, and the morality of taming. I then discuss the objection that moral breeding is conducive to ethically dangerous, selective forms of biological and social engineering. I argue, first, that genetic engineering is only apparently selective. Because Nietzsche rejects the view that traits have intrinsic value, moral breeding is necessarily experimental, selecting actual traits that have proven, in practice, to have subjective, situational value. Bio-engineering, on the contrary, selects traits based on their projected, objective, and non-situational value, based on the deselecting of traits assumed to be essentially bad (e.g., below average intelligence or beauty).
Finally, I argue that moral breeding is a natural morality in an additional sense. Because Nietzsche believes the accidental selection and preservation of traits is the necessary form of all human development, we are unable to opt out of the natural process of breeding. We can choose only to participate intentionally or accidentally. Consequently, the dangers of breeding are lessened, not increased, by bringing moral inquiry into the selection process to counter the ethical dangers of amoral and accidental criteria of breeding.